•'in 
Hi' 


THE  DUAL  ALLIANCE 


■vs. 


THE  TRIPLE  ENTENTE 


GERMANY'S  CASE 


IN  THE 


SUPREME  COURT 
OF  CIVILIZATION 


DR.  KARL  HELFFERICH,  GERMAN 
SECRETARY  OF  THE  TREASURY, 
REVIEWS  THE  "WHITE,"  "YELLOW," 
AND  "ORANGE"  PAPERS,  AND 
REACHES  A  DIFFERENT  CONCLU- 
SION FROM  THAT  OF  JAMES  M. 
BECK,  HOLDING  THE  ALLIES 
RESPONSIBLE    FOR    THE   WAR 


THE  FATHERLAND  CORPORATION 

1123  BROADWAY 

NEW  YORK 


The  Dual  Alliance 

vs. 

The  Triple  Entente 


Germany's  Case  in  the 

Supreme  Court  of 

Civilization 


Dr.  Karl    Helfferich,  German    Secretary  of  the  Treasury, 

Reviews  the  "White,"  "Yellow,"  and  "Orange"  Papers, 

and    Reaches  a  Different   Conclusion   from   that 

of  James    M.    Beck,    Holding    the    Allies 

Responsible  for  the  War 


NEW  YORK 

The  Fatherland  Corporation 

1123  Broadway 

1915 


'y^ 


Dr.  Helfferich's  brilliant  analysis  of  the  world 
situation  was  published  first  by  George  Stilke, 
Berlin,  under  the  title  of  "The  Genesis  of  the 
Great  War."  It  appeared  in  the  N.  Y.  Times 
under  the  title  under  which  it  is  here  reprinted. 


\ 


O^, 


The  following  is  a  translation  from  the  semi-official  Nord- 
deutsche  Allgemeine  Zeitung  of  Jan.  26  of  an  exhaustive  compara- 
tive study  hy  Dr.  Karl  Helfferich  of  the  diplomatic  documents 
published  hy  the  various  warring  countries  concerning  the  origin  of 
the  world  war.  Dr.  Helfferich,  whose  accession  to  the  office  of  Im- 
perial Secretary  of  the  Treasury  was  hailed  with  satisfaction 
throughout  Germany  on  Jan.  16,  was  then  only  43  years  old,  hut 
was  considered  the  leading  financial  authority  in  Germany.  At  that 
time  the  German  newspapers  pointed  out  that  Dr.  Helfferich^s  ap- 
pointment spelled  the  end  of  the  bureaucratic  system  theretofore 
regnant  in  the  Treasury  Department,  and  was  auspicious  for  the 
efficient  and,  thorough-going  management  of  the  office  in  the  enor- 
mous work  that  would  he  thrust  upon  it  when  terms  of  peace  and 
final  international  settlements  would  he  made. 

Dr.  Helfferich  at  the  time  of  his  appointment  to  the  Secretary- 
ship of  the  Treasury  was  Director  of  the  Deutsche  Bank  and  Wirk- 
licher  Legationsrat,  {Actual  Councillor  of  Legation,)  with  the  title 
of  Professor.  It  was  he  who  introduced  the  recent  Reichstag  hiidget 
for  1915  in  the  Federal  Council  and  Reichstag. 


306122 


GERMANY'S  CASE  IN  THE  SUPREME 
COURT  OF  CIVILIZATION 

By  Dr.  Karl  Helfferich. 

The  Governments  of  England,  Russia,  and  France  thought, 
through  the  publication  of  the  exchange  of  diplomatic  writings  of 
the  days  before  the  beginning  of  the  world  war,  they  could  furnish 
a  proof  in  the  eyes  of  their  own  peoples  and  of  the  entire  civilized 
world  that  the  blame  for  the  most  gigantic  shedding  of  blood  which 
the  world  has  ever  experienced  falls  only  upon  "war-lusting 
Germany,"  and  that  they  for  their  part  did  all  in  their  power  to 
avoid  the  catastrophe.  England  has  published  a  "Blue  Book," 
Russia  an  "Orange  Book,"  and  France  a  "Yellow  Book."  A  series 
of  indications  argue  that  these  publications,  which  profess  an 
appearance  of  completeness,  show  important  gaps,  and  particularly 
in  the  case  of  the  French  "Yellow  Book"  the  proof  can  be  regarded 
as  furnished  that  certain  documents  there  republished  w^re  belatedly 
fabricated.  [Note  1.]  Nevertheless  the  publications  deserve  a 
careful  comparative  study. 

No  attempt  will  be  made  here  to  follow  in  all  their  details  the 
extraordinarily  tangled  diplomatic  windings  and  cross-windings  that 


i  I 


[Note  1. — Thus  the  ** Yellow  Book/'  in  its  first  chapter,  entitled 
Avertissements,"  contains  a  series  of  documents  which,  beginning 
from  March,  1913,  are  intended  to  prove  a  growing  war  sentiment  in 
Germany.  Among  them,  designated  as  No.  5,  dated  July  30,  1913,  is  a 
note  of  the  French  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  in  which  is  said: 

''M.  von  Kiderlen  fut  I'horame  le  plus  hai  de  I'Allemagne,  I'hiver 
dernier.  Cependant  il  commence  a  n'etre  plus  que  deconsidere,  car  il 
laisse  entendre  qu'il  prendra  sa  ravanche. "  ('*Herr  von  Kiderlen  was 
last  Winter  the  best-hated  man  in  Germany.  At  present  he  is  beginning 
to  be  only  disliked  (instead  of  hated,)  for  he  allows  it  to  be  under- 
stood that  he  will  take  his   revenge    (for  Morocco.") 

Secretary  of  State  von  Kiderlen,  who,  according  to  this,  began  to 
meditate  vengeance  in  July,  1913,  had  already  died  in  December,  1912, 
a  fact  which  was  manifestly  not  realized  by  that  official  of  the  Quai 
d'Orsay  who  belatedly  fabricated   this   ''Yellow   Book"   document. 

A  similar  misfortune  happened  in  the  case  of  a  note  which,  accord- 
ing to  the  English  "Blue  Book,"  M.  Paul  Cambon,  French  Ambassador 
to  London,  ostensibly  handed  on  July  30,  1914,  to  the  English  Secretary 
of   Foreififn   Affairs,   and   the    contents   of   which   deal   with   the  German 


•G         Gernnmif  §  Case  in  the  Supreme  Court  of  Civilization 

prec^xled  the  beginning  of  the  war.  Rather,  it  is  here  pertinent  only 
to  present  to  the  world  merely  the  most  important  happenings  that 
brought  on  the  war,  by  means  of  the  evidence  offered  by  the  Triple 
Entente  powers  themselves. 

For  this  purpose,  only  those  steps  will  next  be  ascertained  which 
directly  caused  the  outbreak  of  the  war.  Pursued  from  this  point 
the  threads  will  be  followed  backward  and  untangled  as  far  as 
possible. 

The  Firebrands. 

There  can  be  no  doubt  about  the  direct  cause  of  the  war.  The 
cause  was  the  general  mobilization  of  the  Eussian  fighting  forces 
on  land  and  sea  ordered  by  the  Czar  early  on  the  morning  of  July 
31,  and  the  refusal  of  Eussia  to  rescind  this  measure  as  demanded 
by  Germany. 

It  is  important  to  establish  right  here  the  fact  that  the  Eussian 
Government  was  fully  clear  in  its  knowledge  that  the  ordering  of 
general  mobilization  and  the  maintenance  of  this  step  must  make 
war  with  Germany  inevitable.  In  official  and  unofficial  wavs  it  was 
made  clear  with  all  empliasis  to  the  Eussian  Government  in  good 
time  that  a  Eussian  mobilization  meant  the  same  as  a  German 
mobilization  and  a  German  mobilization  meant  the  same  as  w^ar. 
[Xote  2.] 

military  preparations  on  the  Alsace-Lorraine  border  ("Blue  Book,'^ 
No.  105,  Annex  3.)  Through  the  dating  of  this  note  on  July  30,  the 
impression  was  to  be  created  that  at  that  time,  and  even  in  the  days 
preceding,  the  German  troops  had  already  stood  close  to  the  border 
and  had  even  crossed  the  border  through  patrols.  The  note  begins, 
in  the  wording  of  the  third  edition  of  the  ''Blue  Book:"  "L'armee 
allemande  a  ses  avant-postes  sur  nos  bornes-frontiers,  hier  par  deux  f ois 
des  patrouilles  allemandes  out  penetre  sur  notre  territoire"  (''the 
German  Army  has  its  advance  posts  on  our  border:  yesterday  the  Ger- 
man  patrols  twice   penetrated  upon   our   territory.") 

"Yesterday,"  in  a  note  transmitted  on  July  30,  naturally  means 
July  29.  The  29th  of  July  was  a  Wednesday.  "^In  the  first  edition  of 
the  "Blue  Book,"  however,  it  read  "hier,  vendredi"  ("yesterday, 
Friday");  the  "vendredi"  was  stricken  out  only  afterward,  when  the 
inconsistency  was  noticed.  From  this  it  appears  that  the  note  osten- 
sibly transmitted  on  July  30  could  at  all  events  have  been  framed  only 
on  Sunday,  Aug.  1,  quite  aside  from  the  fact  that  no  trespass  across 
the  border  took  place  either  on  July  29  or  July  30.] 

[Note  2. — According  to  the  German  "White  Book"  the  German 
Ambassador  in  St,  Petersburg  was  instructed  on  July  26  to  hand  to  the 
Kussian  Government  a  declaration  in  which  it  was  said: 

"Preparatory  military  measures  on  the  part  of  Eussia  will  compel 
us  to  take  similar  measures,  which  must  consist  in  the  mobilization  of 
the   army.     But   mobilization   means  war."] 


Germani/'s  Cose  in  the  Supreme  Court  of  Civilization         7 

*  The  reasons  are  patent  and  decisive.  Germany,  in  view  of  the 
danger  of  a  war  on  several  fronts,  could  not  possibly  forego  the 
advantage  of  time  which  was  assured  for  it  by  the  more  speedy 
mobilization  of  its  own  forces,  as  soon  as  the  situation  shaped  itself 
to  a  general  Eussian  mobilization.  For  this  compelling  reason  of 
self-maintenance.  Germany  could  not  for  a  moment  entertain  the 
question  of  a  mutual  mobilization  and  then  a  state  of  expectant 
facing  of  one  another. 

As  a  proof  that  this  view  of  the  case  was  also  admitted  by  the 
allies  of  Eussia  as  quite  self-evident,  attention  should  be  called  to 
the  report  of  the  English  Ambassador  in  St,  Petersburg,  Sir  G. 
Buchanan,  on  July  25  ("Blue  Book."  No.  17)  Buchanan  reports 
about  an  interview  with  the  Eussian  Foreign  Minister,  M.  Sazonof : 

I  said  all  I  could  to  impress  prudence  on  the  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs,  and  warned  him  that  if  Eussia  mobilized,  Germany  would  not 
be  content  with  mere  mobilization,  or  give  Russia  time  to  carry  out 
herSj  but  would  probably  declare  war  at  once. 

Even  at  the  last  hour  the  German  Kaiser  in  person,  in  his  tele- 
gram of  Julv  30  at  1  o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  called  the  Czar's 
attention  to  the  ''dangers  and  heavy  consequences  of  a  mobilization." 

The  Eussian  Government  and  the  Czar,  therefore,  in  the  order 
of  general  mobilization  that  followed  on  July  31,  must  have  been 
quite  clear  in  their  minds  that  this  order  meant  war. 

If  hereby  the  direct  cause  of  the  outbreak  of  the  war  is  estab- 
lished, there  arises  the  question  through  what  reasons  the  general 
Eussian  mobilization  was  occasioned. 

"We  owe  it  to  those  who  are  responsible  for  the  decisive  steps  to 
examine  next  the  reasons  which  they  themselves  allege. 

Let  us  first  listen  to  the  Czar. 

In  his  teleofram  to  the  German  Kaiser,  of  Julv  30,  at  1 :20 
o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  there  is  no  suggestion  of  an  impending 
general  mobilization,  but  only  a  reference  to  the  steps  that  had  been 
taken  ao^ainst  Austria-Hunaarv : 


'&* 


The  military  measures  now  going  into  force  were  already  decided 
upon  five  days  ago,  and  that  for  reasons  of  defense  against  the  prepara- 
tions of   Austria-Hungary. 

This  telegram   crossed  in  transit  the  telegram  of  the  Kaiser 
mentioned    above,    which    called    attention    to    the    heavy    conse- 


8         Germany^ s  Case  in  tli£  Supreme  Court  of  Civilization 

quences  of  a  Russian  mobilization  and  which  moreover  expressed 
the  fear  that  even  a  mobilization  directed  exclusively  against  Aus- 
tria-Hungary would  endanger,  if  it  would  not  make  impossible,  the 
role  of  mediator  which  the  Kaiser  had  undertaken  at  the  request 
of  the  Czar.  The  Czar  replied  on  July  31,  at  2  o'clock  in  the 
afternoon,  at  an  hour  in  which  the  order  of  general  mobilization  of 
the  entire  Russian  fighting  forces  had  already  been  issued : 

It  is  impossible,  for  technical  reasons,  to  stop  our  military  prepara- 
tions which  have  been  made  necessary  by  the  mobilization  of  Austria- 
Hungary. 

Either  through  the  expression  ^^our  military  preparations"  there 
is  meant  only  the  partial  mobilization  against  Austria-Hungary; 
in  which  case  the  Czar  in  this  telegram  ignores  the  already  com- 
pleted general  mobilization  directed  against  Germany,  which  to  be 
sure,  would  be  the  simplest  method  of  saving  all  efforts  to  find  a 
justification;  or,  on  the  other  hand,  "our  military  preparations" 
means  the  general  mobilization ;  in  which  case  the  Czar  was  able  to 
allege  only  the  military  measures  of  Austria-Hungary  as  justifica- 
tion for  this  decisive  step. 

Now  let  us  listen  to  the  Russian  Minister  of  Foreis^n  Affairs. 

Concerning  the  reasons  alleged  by  the  latter,  the  French  Am- 
bassador at  St.  Petersburg  on  July  31  reported  to  his  Government : 

En  raison  de  la  mobilisation  generale  de  PAutriche  et  des  mesures 
de  mobilisation  prises  secretement,  mais  d'une  maniere  continue,  par 
I'Allemagne  depuis  six  jours,  Pordre  de  la  mobilisation  generale  russe 
a  ete  donne.  (For  the  reason  of  the  general  mobilization  of  Austria 
and  measures  of  mobilization  taken  secretly  but  in  a  continuous  manner 
by  Germany  for  six  days,  the  order  of  general  Russian  mobilization 
has  been  given.)      ^ Yellow  Book,"  No.  118.) 

On  the  same  day  the  English  Aml^assador  in  St.  Petersburg 
reports  to  Sir  Edward  Grey  ("Blue  Book,"  ^o.  113)  that  the 
general  mobilization  was  ordered  in  consequence  of  a  report  of  the 
Russian  Ambassador  at  Vienna  that  Austria-Hungary  was  de- 
termined not  to  tolerate  an  intervention  of  the  powers  and  that 
it  was  setting  its  troops  into  motion  not  only  against  Serbia,  but 
also  against  Russia.    There  is  added: 

Eussia  has  also  reason  to  believe  that  Germanv  is  making  active 
military  preparations,  and  she  cannot  afford  to  let  her  get  a  start. 


Germany* s  Case  in  the  Supreme  Court  of  Civilization        9 

In  the  Eussian  "Orange  Book"  itself  one  will  seek  in  vain  for 
the  reason  for  the  general  mobilization.  The  communications  con- 
cerning this  decisive  step,  which  without  doubt  were  made  to  the 
Russian  Ambassadors  abroad,  are  not  repeated,  and  the  reader 
learns  about  the  fact  of  the  Eussian  mobilization  against  Germany 
only  through  the  circii^ar  telegram  in  which  Sazonof  informs  the 
chiefs  of  the  Eussian  legations  about  the  demand  of  Germany  for 
the  rescinding  of  the  mobilization. 

What,  now,  are  the  reasons  for  the  general  Eussian  mobilization 
that  are  given  in  the  English  and  French  Ambassadors'  reports  and 
the  telegram  of  the  Czar  to  the  German  Kaiser? 

Russian  Mobilization. 

1. — The  Generai.  Eussian  Mobilization  as  a  Eeply  to  the 
Military  Measures  of  Austria-Hungary. — In  order  to  provide 
protection  against  the  alleged  military  preparations  of  Austria- 
Hungary  against  Eussia,  thirteen  army  corps  had  already  been 
mobilized  by  Eussia  on  July  29,  (report  of  the  French  Ambassador 
at  St.  Petersburg  on  July  29,  "Yellow  Book,''  No.  100.)  The 
mobilization  in  the  districts  of  Odessa,  Kiev,  Moscow,  and  Kazan 
was  announced  through  the  Eussian  Ambassador  in  Berlin  to  the 
German  Government,  with  the  justification  that  this  measure  was 
the  reply  to  the  Austro-Hungarian  declaration  of  war  against 
Serbia,  which  had  taken  place  on  the  day  before,  and  to  the 
'^mesures  de  mobilisation  deja  appliquees  a  la  plus  grande  partie 
de  I'armee  austro-hongroise."  (^TTellow  Book,"  No.  95.)  As  a 
matter  of  fact,  Austria- Hungary,  until  the  time  of  the  general  Eus- 
sian mobilization,  had  mobilized  only  eight  army  corps.  Contrary 
to  the  assertion  of  the  French  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg  of 
July  31,  ("Yellow  Book,"  No.  118,)  (see  Note  3,)  a  general  mobili- 
zation in  Austria-Hungary  had  not  yet  been  ordered  at  the  moment 
of  the  Eussian  general  mobilization.  Such  an  order,  indeed, 
followed  more  as  an  answer  to  the  Eussian  general  mobilization  in 
the  course  of  July  31.     The  mobilization  of  thirteen  army  corps 

[Note  3, — This  false  assertion,  which  was  never  maintained  by  the 
Eussian  side  itself,  of  the  general  Austrian  mobilization  that  was  said 
for  its  part  to  have  induced  Eussia  to  make  a  general  mobilization, 
reappears  at  various  points  in  the  French  ** Yellow  Book'*;  thus,  in 
the  circular  note  of  Viviani  of  Aug.  1  (No.  127)  ^'PAutriche  a  la 
premiere,  procede  h.  une  mobilization  gen6rale"  ('*  Austria  was  the 
first  to  proceed  to  a  general  mobilization.")] 


10       Germany* s  Case  in  the  Supreme  Court  of  Civilization 

ordered  by  Eussia  on  July  29  was,  as  a  counter-measure  to  the 
mobilization  of  eight  Austro-Hungarian  army  corps,  in  itself 
excessive  and  challenging.  Nothing  had  happened  on  the  part  of 
the  Danube  Monarchy  after  July  29  that  could  have  offered  Russia 
occasion  to  proceed  from  the  very  extensive  partial  mobilization  to 
the  general  mobilization  which  made  the  war  inevitable. 

2. — The  Alleged  Military  Preparations  of  Germany 
Against  Russia. — The  Russian  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  in  that 
critical  time  repeatedly  saw  and  spoke  to  the  German  Ambassador 
each  day.  If  the  Russian  Government  thought  it  had  knowledge  of 
measures  of  mobilization  which  Germany  was  alleged  to  have  made 
as  long  as  six  days  before,  that  is  to  say,  since  July  25  ('^Yellow 
Book,^'  No.  118,)  then  nothing  would  have  been  more  natural  than 
for  M.  Sazonof  to*  ask  Count  Pourtales  for  explanation  concerning 
this  alleged  mobilization,  or  to  have  called  his  attention  to  the  fact 
that  such  measures  could  not  remain  without  counter-measures  on 
the  part  of  Russia.  An  indication  by  Sazonof  concerning  these 
alleged  German  preparations  would  have  been  given  all  the  more 
because  Count  Pourtales  in  those  days  repeatedly  "balled  attention 
to  the  dangers  of  the  Russian  military  preparations.  So,  on  July 
29,  with  the  result  that  Sazonof  confined  himself  to  replying 
thereto : 

Que  les  preparatifs  russes  sont  motives:  d'une  cote  par  I'intran- 
sigeance  obstinee  de  I'Autriche  d'aiitre  part,  par  le  fait  que  huit  corps 
austro-hongrois,  sont  deja  mobilises  (that  the  Eussian  preparations  are 
motived  on  the  one  hand  by  the  obstinate  intransigeance  of  Austria, 
and  on  the  other  by  the  fact  that  eight  Austro-Hungarian  corps  are 
already   mobilized.)    (''Yellow  Book,''  No.   100.) 

On  July  30  also  Count  Pourtales  reverted  to  the  Russian  prepa- 
rations without  SazonoFs  feeling  himself  called  upon  to  ask  a  ques- 
tion in  turn  about  the  alleged  German  measures  of  mobilization. 
("Yellow  Book,'^  No.  103.)  The  Czar,  too,  in  his  telegram  to  the 
German  Kaiser,  at  no  time  and  no  place  mentions  anything  what- 
ever about  the  German  military  measures,  which,  according  to  the 
presentation  of  the  facts  offered  by  his  Government,  furnished  a 
reason  for  the  Russian  general  mobilization. 

German  Preparations. 

The  falsity  of  the  justification  of  the  Russian  general  mobiliza- 
tion by  means  of  the  German  measures  is  fully  exposed  by  the 


Germany's  Case  in  the  Supreme  Court  of  Civilization       11 

fact  that  the  French  "Yellow  Book"  confirms  the  fact  (No.  102) 
that  the  Russian  Chief  of  the  General  Staff  on  July  29  gave  his 
word  of  honor  to  the  German  Military  Attache  that  the  military 
measures  of  Eussia  were  directed  exclusively  against  Austria- 
Hungary  and  not  against  Germany  also.  If  Eussia  believed  it 
knew  of  military  measures  taken  by  Germany,  would  the  Eussian 
Chief  of  the  General  Staff  then  have  had  any  occasion  to  give  such 
a  word  of  honor?  And  if  information  had  belatedly  been  received 
by  the  Eussian  Government  concerning  threatening  German  mili- 
tary preparations — as  M.  Sazonof,  to  be  sure,  asserted  to  the  French 
and  English  Ambassadors,  but  never  to  the  German  Ambassador — 
would  not  the  Eussian  Chief  of  the  General  Staff  then  have  had  the 
most  urgent  occasion,  because  of  the  word  of  honor  he  had  given, 
to  speak  to  the  German  Military  Attache  about  the  changed  situa- 
tion presented  as  a  result  of  such  information,  and  to  do  this,  too, 
before  the  irremediable  step  of  general  Eussian  mobilization  had 
been  taken?  Nothing  of  all  this  happened.  Eussia  has  justified 
its  general  mobilization  only  to  third  powers,  by  the  alleged  German 
measures ;  but  to  the  German  Kaiser,  the  German  Ambassador,  and 
the  German  Military  Attache,  however,  it  never  uttered  a  word  of 
inquiry,  much  less  of  complaint  against  the  alleged  German  prepa- 
rations, but  rather  gave  calming  assurances  constantly. 

3. — The  Eefusal  of  Austria-Hungary  to  Permit  an  Inter- 
vention BY  THE  Powers. — This  attempt  at  justification,  trans- 
mitted by  the  English  Ambassador  to  London,  is  almost  grotesque 
in  its  effect,  in  conjunction  Avith  the  fact  that  a  new  proposal  for 
mediation  emanating  from  Sir  Edward  Grey  had  already  been 
transmitted  once  by  the  German  Government  to  the  Austro-Hun- 
garian  Government  on  the  preceding  day,  and  that  the  reply  of 
Austria-Hungary  to  this  proposal  had  not  yet  been  given;  that, 
furthermore,  on  the  afternoon  of  July  30,  a  conversation  had  taken 
place  in  Vienna  between  Count  Berchtold  and  the  Eussian  Am- 
bassador, which  the  French  Ambassador  in  Vienna  at  once  tele- 
graphed to  Paris  as  an  interview  of  great  importance,  ("Un 
entretien  de  haute  importance,")  and  which,  in  his  opinion,  per- 
mitted the  belief  to  be  entertained  that  not  every  prospect  of  a 
localization  of  the  conflict  was  lost,  ("Permettait  de  croire  que  toute 
chance  de  localiser  le  conflit  n'etait  pas  perdue.")  ("Yellow  Book," 
No.  104.) 

The  proposal  of  mediation  made  by  Sir  Edward  Grey  on  July 


»• 


12      Germany's  Case  in  the  Supreme  Court  of  Civilization  ^ 

29  suggested:  Austria-Hungary  should  undertake,  after  the  occu- 
pation of  Belgrade  and  the  Serbian  territory  at  the  border,  not  to 
advance  further,  while  the  powers  would  try  to  bring  it  about  that 
Serbia  should  give  to  Austria-Hungary  a  satisfaction  adequate  for 
that  monarchy.  The  territory  occupied  by  the  Austro-Hungarian 
Army  should  be  evacuated  again  after  the  satisfaction  had  been 
rendered.  Sir  Edward  Grey  conveyed  this  proposal  on  July  30  to 
the  English  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg,  and  added : 

I  suggested  this  yesterday  as  a  possible  relief  to  the  situation, 
and  if  it  can  be  obtained  I  would  earnestly  hope  that  it  might  be 
agreed  to  suspend  further  military  preparations  on  all  sides.  ("Blue 
Book,''  No.  103.) 

This  proposal  was  transmitted  and  recommended  by  Germany 
to  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government;  similarly  by  the  English 
and  French  Ambassadors  to  the  Eussian  Government  ("Yellow 
Book,"  No.  112.)  The  proposal  was  not  yet  answered  by  Austria, 
and  Eussia,  too,  had  not  yet  taken  any  attitude  concerning  it,  when 
the  general  Eussian  mobilization  ensued.  The  assertion  that  the 
Eussian  general  mobilization  had  been  made  necessary  because 
Austria-Hungary  declined  all  intervention  by  the  powers,  ("Blue 
Book,"  No.  113,)  is  thus  in  strict  contradiction  to  the  state  of 
affairs  as  pictured  in  the  English  and  French  documents. 

Much  more  important  than  the  fact  that  Eussia  played  out 
the  card  of  general  mobilization,  while  an  as  yet  undisposed  of 
English  proposal  of  mediation  lay  before  its  Government  and  that 
of  Austria-Hungary,  is  the  direct  conversation  which  took  place 
on  the  evening  before  the  general  Eussian  mobilization  between  the 
Eussian  Ambassador  at  Vienna,  M.  Schebeko,  and  Count  Berchtold. 
Let  it  be  recalled  that  after  Sir  Edward  Grey's  first  proposal  of 
conference  had  encountered  difficulties,  Sazonof  himself  had  taken 
the  initiative  toward  direct  negotiations  with  Austria-Hungary  and 
that  this  initiative  had  at  first  been  rejected  in  Vienna.  ("Blue 
Book,"  No.  74.)  In  the  conversation  of  July  30  the  difficulties  in 
the  way  of  the  direct  exchange  of  views  were  obviated.  According 
to  the  cited  report  of  the  French  Ambassador,  ("Yellow  Book,"  No. 
104,)  who  was  informed  of  it  by  the  Eussian  Ambassador  as  was 
his  English  colleague  immediately  after  the  conversation,  M. 
Schebeko  and  Count  Berchtold  examined  the  terrible  difficulties 
that  were  present,  with  the  equal  good  will  to  find  solutions  that 


Germany's  Case  in  the  Supreme  Court  of  Civilization       13 

might  be  acceptable  to  both  sides,  (avec  une  egal  bonne  volonte  d'y 
adapter  des  solutions  reciproquement  acceptables.)  The  Russian 
Ambassador  declared  that  the  military  preparations  of  Russia  had 
no  other  purpose  than  to  safeguard  against  the  Austro-Hungarian 
measures  and  to  announce  the  intention  and  the  right  of  the  Czar 
to  have  a  voice  in  the  settlement  of  the  Serbian  question.  Count 
Berchtold  answered  with  the  declaration  that  the  Austro-Hungarian 
preparations  in  Galicia  likewise  emanated  from  no  purpose  of 
aggression  whatsoever.  On  both  sides  it  was  agreed  to  labor  toward 
the  end  that  the  measures  should  not  be  interpreted  as  hostile  steps. 
The  report  of  the  French  Ambassador  then  continues: 

Pour  le  reglement  dii  confiit  Austro-Serbe  il  a  ete  convenu  que  les 
pourparlers  seraient  repris  a  Petersbourg  entre  M.  Sazonof  et  le  Comte 
Szapary;  s'ils  ont  ete  interrompus,  c'est  par  le  suite  d'un  malentendu, 
le  Comte  Berchtold  croyant  que  le  Ministre  des  Affaires  etrangers  de 
Russie  reclamait  pour  son  interlocuteur  des  pouvoirs  qui  lui  permet- 
traient  de  modifier  les  termes  de  1 'ultimatum  autriehien.  Le  Comte 
Szapary  sera  seulement  autorise  a  diseuter  quel  accommodement  serait 
compatible,  avec  la  dignite  et  le  prestige  dont  les  deux  Empires  ont 
Edward  Grey  proposait  de  confier  aux  quatre  Puissances  non  directe- 
et  reduite  aux  deux  plus  interessees  q 'aurait  lieu  I'examen  que  Sir 
Edward  Grey  Proposait  de  confier  aux  quatre  Puissances  non  directe- 
ment  interessees.  Sir  M.  de  Bunsen,  qui  se  trouvait  chez  moi,  a 
aussitot  declare  a  M.  Schebeko  que  le  Foreign  Ofiice  approuvera 
entierement  cette  nouvelle  procedure.  (With  regard  to  the  settlement 
of  the  Austro-Serbian  dispute,  it  was  agreed  that  the  pourparlers  shall 
be  resumed  in  St.  Petersburg  between  M.  Sazonof  and  Count  Szapary. 
Their  interruption  was  due  to  a  misunderstanding,  Count  Berchtold 
believing  that  the  Russian  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  demanded  that 
his  interlocutor  should  be  given  powers  enabling  him  to  modify  the 
terms  of  the  Austrian  ultimatum.  Count*  Szapary  will  only  be  author- 
ized to  discuss  what  arrangement  would  be  compatible  with  the  dignity 
and  the  prestige  of  the  two  empires,  which  are  to  both  of  them  an  object 
of  equal  care.  For  the  moment,  therefore,  it  will  be  in  this  direct 
form,  confined  to  the  two  most  interested  parties,  that  the  examina- 
tion of  the  situation  will  take  place,  which  Sir  Edward  Grey  proposed 
should  be  undertaken  by  the  four  not  directly  interested  powers.  Sir 
M.  de  Bunsen,  who  was  with  me,  at  once  told  M.  Schebeko  that  the 
Foreign  Office  would  entirely  approve  of  this  new  procedure.) 

The  Kaiser's  Telegram. 

On  the  following  day  the  Russian  Ambassador  in  Berlin  received 
the  communication  that  the  Austro-Hungarian  Ambassador  in  St. 
Petersburg  confirmed  the  declaration  of  Count  Berchtold  to  M. 


14       Germany's  Case  in  tlu  Supreme  Court  of  Civilization 

Schebeko,  with  the  explanation  that  his  Government  was  ready  to 
discuss  with  the  Russian  Government  the  note  to  Serbia,  even  con- 
cerning its  material  content  ("que  son  Gouvernement  etait  pret  a 
discuter  avec  le  Gouvernement  russe  la  note  a  la  Serbie,  meme  quant 
au  fond'')   ("Yellow  Book/'  No.  21.) 

The  Austro-Hungarian  Government  had  thus  on  July  30  taken 
a  decisive  step  on  the  road  of  compliance,  in  resuming  the  direct 
negotiations  with  Russia,  and  thereby  declared  itself  ready  to  enter 
upon  a  till  then  stubbornly  declined  discussion  of  the  material  con- 
tents of  the  note  addressed  to  Serbia.  The  reason  for  this  decisive 
compliance  on  the  part  of  Austria-Hungary,  which  for  the  moment 
was  bound  to  remove  the  acute  character  of  the  crisis,  appears 
forthwith  if  one  examines  the  German  "White  Book."  On  July  28 
the  German  Kaiser  had  telegraphed  to  the  Czar: 

Remembering  the  cordial  friendship  which  has  long  united  us  two 
with  a  firm  bond,  I  am  therefore  exerting  all  my  influence  to  induce 
Austria-Hungary  to  strive  for  an  open  and  satisfying  understanding 
with  Russia. 

And  in  the  telegram  to  the  Czar  on  July  29  the  Kaiser  said : 

I  believe  that  a  direct  understanding  between  your  Government  and 
Vienna  is  possible  and  desirable,  au  understanding  which,  as  I  have 
already  telegraphed  to  you,  my  Government  is  laboring  with  all  its 
power  to  further. 

The  Kaiser  added,  as  may  here  be  emphasized : 

Naturally  military  measures  on  the  part  of  Russia  that  could  be 
interpreted  by  Austria-Hungary  as  a  threat  would  hasten  a  misfortune 
which  we  both  wish  to  avoid,  and  would  also  undermine  my  position 
as  an  intermediary  which — as  your  appeal  to  my  friendship  and  help — 
I   readily  assumed. 

This  sequence  of  facts  is  confirmed  by  a  telegram  of  Sir  Edward 
Grey  to  the  English  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg  on  July  31, 
(Blue  Book  No.  110,)  according  to  which  the  German  Ambassador 
in  London  communicated  to  Grey  "as  a  result  of  suggestions  by  the 
German  Government,"  that  an  expression  of  views  had  taken  place 
in  Vienna  between  Count  Berchtold  and  M.  Schebeko,  and  that  the 
Austro-Hungarian  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg  had  been  in- 
structed to  get  into  communication  with  the  Russian  Minister  of 
Foreign  Affairs,   to   give  the  latter   explanations   concerning   the 


Germany's  Case  in  the  Supreme  Court  of  Civilization       15 

Austro-Hungarian  ultimatum  to  Serbia  and  to  discuss  all  the 
Austro-Hungarian-Russian  relations  concerning  suggestions  and 
questions.  Sir  Edward  Grey  added  that  he  had  taken  cognizance  of 
this  resumption  of  direct  conversations  between  Russia  and  Austria- 
Hungary  with  great  satisfaction. 

Contrary  to  the  assertions  of  the  French  "Yellow  Book"  that 
Germany  at  no  stage  of  the  proceedings  seriously  counseled  in 
Vienna  toward  a  spirit  of  conciliation  and  mutual  concessions,  it  is 
thus  established  firmly  that  upon  the  intercession  of  the  German 
Kaiser  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government  on  the  afternoon  of  July 
30,  yielded  to  the  Russian  wish,  till  then  consistently  rejected,  for  a 
discussion  of  the  note  to  Serbia.  It  is  further  shown  by  the  French 
"Yellow  Book"  that  the  Russian  Ambassador  in  Vienna  attributed 
the  greatest  importance  to  the  conciliatory  declaration  of  Count 
Berchtold  and  immediately  instructed  his  French  and  English 
colleagues  about  this  declaration.  It  is  further  established  through 
the  French  "Yellow  Book"  that  the  French  Ambassador  in  Vienna 
based  the  hope  of  a  localizing  of  the  conflict  upon  the  conciliatory 
stand  of  Count  Berchtold,  and  that  the  English  Ambassador,  with- 
out first  inquiring  back  in  London,  expressed  the  complete  agree- 
ment of  the  Foreign  Office  in  the  procedure  discussed  between 
Count  Berchtold  and  the  Russian  Ambassador. 

But  it  is  furthermore  a  fact  that  the  Russian  "Orange  Book" 
shows  not  a  trace  of  this  decisive  attitude  of  concession  on  the 
part  of  Austria-Hungary,  and  finally,  that  this  attitude  of  con- 
cession on  the  part  of  Austria-Hungary  was  answered  by  the  Rus- 
sian Government  with  the  general  mobilization  which  made  the  war 
inevitable. 

Blames  Russian  War  Party. 

To  this  is  to  be  attributed  the  fact  that  the  general  mobilization 
came  as  a  complete  surprise  to  the  two  Entente  associates  of  Russia 
who,  according  to  their  own  documents,  had  welcomed  the  con- 
ciliatory spirit  of  Austria-Hungary  with  great  aotisf action  as  a 
hope  of  peace.  Proof  of  this:  On  July  31  at  7  o'clock  in  the 
evening,  the  German  Ambassador  at  Paris  spoke  to  the  French 
President  of  Ministers  and  Foreign  Minister,  M.  Viviani,  to  inform 
him  that  Germany  was  compelled  by  the  general  mobilization  of 
Russia  to  proclaim  the  state  of  threatening  danger  of  war,  and  to 
demand  that  Russia  demobilize. 


16       Germany's  Case  in  the  Supreme  Court  of  Civilization 

To  this  M.  Viviani  replied: 

That  he  was  in  no  way  informed  of  the  alleged  mobilization  of 
the  Eussian  Army  and  Navy  (nullement  renseign6  sur  une  pretendue 
mobilisation  totale  de  I'armee  et  de  la  fiotte  russes,)  ("Yellow  Book/' 
No.   117.) 

The  English  Ambassador  at  Paris,  too,  reported  late  in  the 
evening  of  July  31  to  the  Foreign  Office  that  his  colleague  Iswolsky 
was  not  in  the  slightest  aware  of  a  general  Russian  mobilization. 
("Blue  Book,"  No.  117.) 

If,  therefore,  the  reasons  alleged  by  Russia  for  the  sudden 
general  mobilization  were  merely  transparent  pretexts,  and  if 
Russia  broke  the  momentous  measure  in  question  across  its  knee, 
without  even  informing  England  and  France  at  that  moment,  when 
an  English  proposal  for  mediation  that  was  full  of  hope  had  been 
spread  out,  and  when  the  compliance  of  Austria-Hungary  effected 
by  Germany  must  have  obviated  the  acute  danger  of  war,  then  there 
remains  only  one  explanation  for  this : 

The  personages  who  had  the  deciding  voice  at  that  moment  in 
Russia,  in  view  of  the  compliance  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Govern- 
ment that  w^as  manifesting  itself  as  a  result  of  German  efforts, 
desired  to  break  off  all  the  bridges  that  led  to  peace  and  to  make 
the  war  inevitable. 

If  this  patent  conclusion  needed  a  further  corroboration,  that 
would  be  provided  by  the  attitude  of  Russia  after  the  transmission 
of  the  German  ultimatum. 

While  Germany,  which  had  heretofore  designated  the  Russian 
mobilization  as  a  casus  belli,  was  content  for  the  time  being  to  pro- 
claim the  state  of  threatening  danger  of  war,  which  is  not  yet 
equivalent  to  mobilization,  and  left  the  Russian  Government  twelve 
hours  (ending  at  noon  on  Aug.  1)  in  which  to  rescind  its  mobiliza- 
tion, Russia  left  the  German  Ambassador  without  any  answer 
whatsoever,  and  made  no  attempt  whatever  to  avert  the  utmost 
extreme  by  the  intermediation  of  a  third  party;  but,  on  the  other 
hand,  in  the  night  of  Aug.  1  to  2  opened  hostilities  at  three  points 
on  the  Prussian  frontier. 

In  the  face  of  this  indisputable  state  of  facts,  the  French 
Government  dares  to  offer  the  following  presentation  of  the  case 
(Circular  note  of  the  French  Government  of  Aug.  1,  "Yellow 
Book,"  No.  120)  : 

Austria-Hungary  has  at  last  allowed  itself  to  be  found  ready  to 


Germany's  Case  in  the  Supreme  Court  of  Civilization       17 

discuss  materially  the  contents  of  its  ultimatum  to  Serbia.  Russia 
is  ready,  on  the  basis  of  the  English  proposal,  to  enter  into  negotia- 
tions {"le  Gouvernement  russe  est  pret  a  entrer  en  negociation  sur 
la  base  de  la  proposition  anglaise/')  Unfortunately,  these  pros- 
pects for  a  peaceful  solution  are  destroyed  by  the  ultimatum  of 
Germany  which  demands  demobilization  of  Russia.  The  ultimatum 
is  unjustified,  since  Russia  has  accepted  the  English  propositioi? 
which  includes  a  stopping  of  military  preparations  ("puisque  la 
Russie  a  accepte  la  proposition  anglaise  qui  implique  un  arret  des 
preparatifs  militaires  de  toutes  les  puissances.")  Germany's  atti- 
tude proves  that  it  wants  the  war. 

History  in  the  making  can  scarcely  be  falsified  more  light- 
heartedly  than  this. 

It  is  true,  to  be  sure,  that  Austria-Hungary  showed  itself  to  be 
compliant  and  thereby  gave  all  justification  to  hope  for  peace.  But 
the  French  circular  note  keeps  quiet  the  fact  that  this  compliance 
is  to  be  traced  to  the  influence  of  Germany;  the  French  Foreign 
Minister  had  even  the  face  to  assert  in  the  Chamber  of  Deputies 
on  Aug.  4  that  Germany — from  July  24  until  its  ultimatum  handed 
in  on  July  31,  under  the  pretext  (!)  of  the  general  mobilization 
ordered  by  Russia — had  not  participated  by  any  positive  actions  in 
the  pacific  conciliatory  efforts  of  the  Triple  Entente  ("Yellow 
Book,"  No.  159.) 

It  is  false  that  Russia  accepted  the  English  proposition  which 
included  the  cessation  of  military  preparations  by  all  the  powers 
and  that  thereby  it  deprived  the  German  ultimatum  in  advance  of 
all  justification. 

In  the  second  place,^the  English  proposition  above  mentioned 
("Blue  Book,"  No.  103)  did  not  contain  the  condition  of  the 
stopping  of  all  military  preparations,  but  rather  only  the  earnest 
hope  was  expressed  by  Sir  Edward  Grey  that  with  the  acceptance 
of  his  proposition  the  military  preparations  would  be  halted  by  all 
sides.  Furthermore,  Russia  did  not  accept  the  English  proposition, 
neither  before  nor  after  the  transmission  of  the  German  ultimatum ; 
the  circular  note  of  Viviani,  ("Yellow  Book,"  No.  120,)  which  in 
its  fifth  paragraph  asserts  the  completed  acceptance  of  the  English 
proposition,  itself  states  in  its  fourth  paragraph  that  the  Russian 
Government  was  "pret  a  entre  en  negociation  sur  la  base  de  la 
proposition  anglaise,"  and  certainly  there  is  a  difference  between  the 
acceptance  of  a  proposition  and  the  willingness  to  negotiate  on  the 


18       Germany' s  Case  in  the  Suprerrle  Court  of  Civilization 


basis  thereof.  But,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  Eussia's  Foreign  Minister 
did  not  even  declare  himself  ready  to  enter  upon  negotiations  on 
the  basis  of  the  English  proposition;  rather,  he  made  a  counter- 
proposal to  the  English  Ambassador,  which  differed  essentially  from 
the  English  proposition,  as  the  following  comparison  shows : 


Eussian   Counter-Proposition, 
(''Orange  Book/'  No.  67.) 

Si  PAutriche  consent  a  arreter 
la  marche  de  ses  armees  sur  le 
territoire  serbe,  (If  Austria  con- 
sents to  halt  the  advance  of  its 
armies   on   Serbian  territory,) 

et  si,  reconnaissant  que  le  conflit 
austro-serbe  a  assume  le  caractere 
d'une  question  europeenne,  (and 
if,  recognizing  that  the  Austro- 
Serbian  conflict  has  assumed  the 
character  of  a  European  question,) 

elle  admet  que  les  Grandes  Puis- 
sances examinent  la  satisfaction 
que  la  Serbie  pourrait  accorder  au 
Gouvernement  d'Autriche-Hongrie, 
(Austria  admits  that  the  great 
powers  may  examine  the  satisfac- 
tion which  Serbia  could  accord  to 
the  Government  of  Austria-Hun- 
gary,) 

sans  laisser  porter  atteinte  a  ses 
droits  d  'Etat  souverain  et  a  son 
independence,  (without  injury  to 
its  rights  as  a  sovereign  State  and 
its  independence,) 
la  Eussia  s  'engage  a  conserver  son 
attitude  expectante,  (Eussia  en- 
gages to  maintain  its  expectant 
attitude,) 


English  Proposition, 
(''Blue  Book,"  No.  103.) 

Austria,  after  taking  Belgrade 
and  Serbian  territory  in  region  of 
frontier,  to  promise  not  to  advance 
further. 


Sir  Edward  Grey  had  not  asked 
for  this  recognition,  and  the 
Austro-Hungarian  Government  had 
steadily  declined  to  permit  its  con- 
flict with  Serbia  to  be  treated  as 
a  European  question — 

while  powers  endeavored  to  ar- 
range that  Serbia  should  give 
satisfaction  sufficient  to  pacify 
Austria — 


this  conation  which,  moreover, 
had  already  been  fulfilled  by  the 
declaration  of  the  Austro-Hun- 
garian Government,  did  not  figure 
in  the  English  proposition,  but 
rather  there  was  therein  provided 
that  Austria-Hungary,  after  satis- 
faction had  been  received,  was  to 
evacuate  again  the  occupied  Ser- 
bian territory.  ("Territory  occu- 
pied would  of  course  be  evacuated 
when  Austria  was  satisfied.") 


— which  expectant  attitude  heretofore  had  consisted  in  the  progress 
of  the  warlike  preparations  up  to  the  general  mobilization. 


Germany'' s  Case  in  the  Supreme  Court  of  Civilization       19 

Such  a  counter-proposition,  which  is  marked  by  an  almost  classi- 
cal naivete,  the  French  Government  before  its  diplomatic  repre- 
sentatives, its  Chamber,  and  the  civilized  world  calls :  the  acceptance 
of  the  English  proposition  which  included  the  stopping  of  military 
preparations. 

That  Russia,  moreover,  did  not  even  think  of  stopping  its 
military  preparations  is  confirmed  by  M.  Sazonof  himself  very 
emphatically  on  July  31,  on  the  occasion  of  the  presentation  of  his 
counter-proposition  to  the  English  Ambassador,  in  declaring  to  him 
"it  was  of  .course  impossible  to  stop  a  mobilization  which  was  al- 
ready in  progress.'' 

No  distortion,  no  matter  how  unabashed,  can  obscure  the  fact 
that  after  the  Austro-Hungarian  attitude  of  conciliation  induced 
by  Germany  had  given  anew  ground  to  hope  for  the  maintenance 
of  peace,  Russia,  without  notifying  either  its  opponent  or  its  allies, 
precipitated  the  general  mobilization  that  sealed  the  war,  whilst 
Germany  refrained  with  its  counter-measures  to  the  very  limit  of 
self-preservation.  The  authoritative  circles  of  Russia  wanted  the 
war,  and  wanted  it  with  redoubled  brutality  when  the  prospect  of 
a  peaceful  settlement  showed  itself. 

The  Accomplices. 

If  the  foregoing  deductions,  which  one  and  all  are  based  solely 
upon  the  documents  of  the  Triple  Entente  Governments,  show  the 
incontrovertible  certainty  that  the  authoritative  circle  in  Russia 
wanted  the  war  and  forced  it,  there  arises  the  question  how  this 
determination,  so  universally  momentous  in  its  responsibilities, 
came  to  be  adopted. 

The  compelling  reason  of  self-preservation  will  not  hold,  for 
Russia  was  menaced  by  no  one. 

The  protection  of  Serbia  also  will  not  hold,  for,  aside  from  the 
fact  that  Serbia  stood  in  no  relationship  of  protection  that  imposed 
protection,  morally  or  politically,  upon  Russia  as  a  duty,  Austria- 
Hungary  had  pledged  itself  to  the  various  great  powers  to  preserve 
the  integrity  and  sovereignty  of  Serbia. 

Even  the  maintenance  of  the  Russian  prestige  in  the  Balkans 
was,  after  the  attitude  of  conciliation  shown  by  Austria-Hungary, 
no  longer  an  issue  that  could  justify  an  appeal  to  arms. 

The  bringing  on  of  the  war  was,  therefore,  for  Russia  a  question 
pure  and  simple  of  opportunity.     In  lack  of  compelling  reasons, 


20       Germany* s  Case  in  the  Supreme  Court  of  Civilization 

the  decision  for  the  war  could  only  be  brought  about  by  the  convic- 
tion: the  opportunity  is  favorable  for  forcing  down  those  great 
powers  which  appeared  to  the  authoritative  Eussian  personages  as 
obstacles  in  their  course. 

Left  to  depend  upon  itself  alone,  Eussia  would  have  risked  the 
war  with  Austria-Hungary  and  Germany  only  in  an  extreme  case 
in  the  defense  of  national  vital  interests,  but  never  as  a  result  of 
weighing  the  probable  result.  Only  the  assurance  of  the  active  co- 
operation of  other  great  powers  could  therefore  have  made  possible 
the  determination  of  the  leading  circles  of  Eussia  for  war.  The 
attitude  of  the  two  other  powers  of  the  Triple  Entente  must  there- 
fore be  of  decisive  influence  for  the  Eussian  determination. 

Of  this  the  documents  of  the  Triple  Entente  Governments  con- 
tain the  corroboration. 

The  co-operation  of  France  was  by  no  means  assured  a  priori, 
much  less  the  co-operation  of  England.  The  Franco-Eussian 
treaty  of  alliance  did  not  pledge  France  to  an  unconditional  ac- 
companiment of  Eussia  in  war,  and  between  Eussia  and  England 
there  existed  no  sort  of  precise  agreement.  In  the  Austro-Hun- 
gari an- Serbian  conflict  that  arose  out  of  the  assassination  of  the 
Austro-Hungarian  heir  apparent  and  his  wife,  the  sympathies  of 
those  not  directly  concerned  could  only  be  on  the  side  of  Austria- 
Hungary.  On  that  point  they  were  clear  also  in  Eussia,  and  this 
clearness  of  view  was  shown  by  the  fact  that  the  Eussian  Govern- 
ment, after  the  transmission  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  ultimatum 
to  Serbia,  displayed  a  certain  caution  for  a  time. 

French  Circular  Note. 

Thus  the  French  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg  wired  to  his 
Government  on  July  24  ("Yellow  Book,"  No.  31,)  after  Sazonof 
had  received  cognizance  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  note  to  Serbia, 
that  the  dispositions  of  the  Czar  and  his  Ministers  were  of  the  most 
peaceful;  and  on  July  25  ("Yellow  Book,"  No.  38)  : 

M.  Sazonof  garde  toute  sa  moderation:  II  faut  eviter,  m'a-t-il  dit, 
tout  ce  qui  pourrait  precipiter  la  crise.  J'estime  que,  meme  si  le 
Gouvernement  austro-hongrois  passait  a  Paction  contre  la  Serbie,  nous 
ne  devrions  pas  rompre  les  negociations  (M.  Sazonof  maintains  all  his 
moderation:  It  is  necessary,  he  told  me,  to  avoid  everything  that  can 
precipitate  the  crisis.  I  am  of  the  opinion  that  even  if  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  Government  should  pass  to  action  against  Serbia  we  should 
not  break  off  negotiations). 


GerTuany's  Case  in  the  Supreme  Court  of  CiviUzation       21 

On  July  26  the  French  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs  wrote  in  a 
circular  note  ("Yellow  Book,"  No.  50)  : 

De  P^tersbourg  nous  apprenons  que  M.  Sazonof  a  conseille  a  la 
Serbie  de  demander  la  mediation  anglaise.  Dans  le  Conseil  des  Ministres 
du  25,  tenu  en  presence  de  TEmpereur,  la  mobilisation  de  treize  corps 
d'armee  6ventuellement  destines  a  operer  contre  TAutriche  a  ete 
envisagee;  cette  mobilisation  ne  serait  toutefois  rendu  effective  que  si 
TAutriche  contraignait  la  Serbie  par  la  force  des  amies,  et  seulement 
apres  avis  du  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etrangeres  a  qui  le  soin  incorabe 
de  fixer  la  date,  liberte  lui  etant  laissee  de  continuer  les  negoeiations 
meme  dans  le  cas  ou  Belgrade  serait  occupee.  (From  St.  Petersburg 
we  learn  that  M.  Sazonof  has  advised  Servia  to  ask  for  English  media- 
tion. In  the  Council  of  Ministers  of  the  25th,  held  in  the  presence  of 
the  Emperor,  the  mobilization  of  thirteen  army  corps,  eventually 
destined  against  Austria,  was  envisaged;  but  this  mobilization  is  to  be- 
come effective  only  if  Austria  does  violence  to  Serbia,  and  only  according 
to  the  advice  of  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  to  whom  shall  be  left 
the  fixing  of  the  date,  in  which  he  is  at  liberty  to  continue  the  nego- 
tiations even  in  the   case  of  the  occupation  of  Belgrade.) 

That  this  moderation  was  not  genuine  appears  even  from  the 
fact  that  M.  Sazonof  as  early  as  the  24th  of  July  declared  to  the 
English  Ambassador  (''Blue  Book,"  No.  6)  :  "that  Russian 
mobilization  would  at  any  rate  h-ave  to  be  carried  out,"  from  which 
it  appears  that  the  Russian  mobilization  was  already  in  progress  on 
July  24,  the  day  on  which  the  Austro-Hungarian  note  was  an- 
nounced, whilst  the  French  circular  note  of  July  26  ("Yellow 
Book,"  No.  50)  has  the  partial  mobilization  against  Austria-Hun- 
gary "envisaged"  only  on  July  25,  and  makes  its  going  into  force 
contingent  upon  the  Austrian  force  of  arms  against  Serbia  and 
the  advice  of  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs.  It  is  nevertheless 
important,  however,  that  the  Russian  and  French  Governments  at 
that  time  still  wished  to  call  attention  to  the  outward  moderation. 

The  reason  is  manifestly  that  the  Russian  Government  at  that 
time  was  not  yet.  sure  of  the  co-operation  of  the  English  Govern- 
ment, and  even  of  that  of  the  French  Government.  In  the  conversa- 
tion which  Sazonof  at  his  request  had  on  July  24  at  the  house  of 
the  French  Ambassador  with  the  latter  and  Sir  G.  Buchanan, 
("Blue  Book,"  No.  6,)  Sazonof  demanded  that  England  should 
declare  its  solidarity  with  Russia  and  France,  whereupon  Buchanan 
very  shrewdly  replied : 


22       Germany's  Case  in  the  Supreme  Court  of  Civilization 

I  could  not,  of  course,  speak  in  the  name  of  his  Majesty's  Govern- 
ment, but  personally  I  saw  no  reason  to  expect  any  declaration  of 
solidarity  from  his  Majesty's  Government  that  would  entail  an  uncon- 
ditional engagement  on  their  part  to  support  Eussia  and  France  by 
arms.  Direct  British  interests  in  Serbia  were  nil,  and  a  war  on  behalf 
of  that   country  would  never  be  sanctioned  by  British  public   opinion. 

How  the  French  Ambassador  acted  towards  M.  Sazonof  cannot 
be  established  absolutely,  for  the  French  "Yellow  Book''  signifi- 
cantly contains  no  report  about  this  important  conversation,  and 
Sir  G.  Buchanan  confines  himself  in  his  report  to  saying  that  his 
French  colleague  had  given  him  to  understand  ("gave  me  to  under- 
stand'') that  France  would  fulfill  all  duties  imposed  by  its  alliance 
with  Eussia.  Such  an  attitude  left  open  the  neutrality  of  France 
in  a  Russian  war  of  aggression.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  as  we  shall 
see  later,  France  gave  to  the  Russian  Government  its  consent  to 
unconditional  armecl  help  only  at  a  later  stage  of  the  case. 

We  shall  now  consider  how  the  attitude  of  France  and  England 
developed. 

France. 

The  French  Government  manifestly  found  itself  in  ^  heavy 
dilemma.  On  the  one  side  its  entire  policy  for  decades  was  based 
upon  the  closest  junction  with  Russia;  on  the  other  hand,  there 
weighed  heavily  the  responsibility  to  take  a  stand  unconditionally 
with  Russia  in  the  bad  Serbian  matter  and  to  risk  alone  with  Russia 
a  war  against  Germany  and  Austria-Hungary. 

Therefore  the  French  statesmen  were  moved  by  a  double  fear: 
the  fear  of  awakening  distrust  in  the  Russian  Government,  and  of 
isolating  France  by  a  loosening  of  the  Franco-Russian  relation ;  the 
second,  the  fear  of  standing  alone  with  Russia  in  a  war  against 
Germany  and  Austria-Hungary. 

The  effect  of  the  first  fear  was  that  the  French  Government 
refused  to  attempt  any  influence  in  St.  Petersburg  in  a  pacific 
sense,  which  might  there  be  interpreted  as  a  defection  of  France 
from  Russia.  The  various  urgent  steps  taken  by  the  German 
Ambassador  in  Paris  after  the  handing  over  of  the  Austro-Hun- 
garian  note  to  Serbia,  in  order  to  impress  upon  the  French  Cabinet 
the  gravity  of  the  situation  and  to  point  out  how  necessary  a 
moderating  influence  of  France  was  in  St.  Petersburg,  were  al- 
ways received  with  the  greatest  distrust  and  suspected  of  being 
attempts  to  drive  a  wedge  between  France  and  Russia. 


Germany\s  Case  in  tlie  Supreme  Court  of  Civilization       23 

When,  after  the  transmission  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  ulti- 
matum to  Serbia,  the  German  Ambassador  in  Paris  gave  to  the 
French  Government  the  correct  and  faithful  explanation  that  the 
German  Government  regarded  the  matter  as  one  that  should  be 
settled  exclusively  between  Austria-Hungary  and  Serbia,  and  de- 
sired urgently  the  localization  of  the  conflict,  since  every  interven- 
tion of  another  power  might,  by  the  natural  play  of  the  existing 
alliances,  bring  on  incalculable  consequences,  the  echo  of  this  com- 
munication was  an  article  in  the  "Echo  de  Paris,"  the  intimate 
relations  of  which  to  the  Quai  d'Orsay  are  well  known.  In  this 
article,  the  step  of  the  German  Ambassador  was  branded  as  a 
"menace  allemande.''     ("Yellow  Book,''  No.  36.) 

When,  two  days  later,  on  July  26,  the  German  Ambassador  sug- 
gested to  the  French  Government  to  interfere  with  the  Russian 
Government  in  a  pacific  sense,  and  added  that  Austria-Hungary, 
according  to  the  declarations  given  to  Russia,  was  seeking  neither 
territorial  aggrandizement  nor  impairment  of  the  integrity  of 
Serbia,  but  only  to  safeguard  itself,  the  answer  was  that  Russia 
had  done  nothing  that  could  cause  apprehension  concerning  its 
moderation ;  but  that  Germany  should  intervene  in  Vienna  in  order 
to  prevent  military  operations  against  Serbia  ('^Yellow  Book,"  No. 
56.)  And  wlien  the  German  Ambassador,  warned  by  the  attitude 
of  the  "Echo  de  Paris,"  made  the  proposition  to  issue  a  notice  to 
the  press  concerning  the  conversation,  in  which  notice  it  should 
be  said  that  he  had  in  a  new  conversation  with  the  Minister  of 
Foreign  Affairs  examined  in  a  friendly  spirit  and  with  the  feeling 
of  pacific  solidarity  the  means  of  preserving  peace,  then  the  thought 
of  the  public  announcement  of  a  "solidarite  pacifique"  with  Germany 
awakened  a  veritable  terror  ("Yellow  Book,"  No.  57,)  and  the 
notice  suggested  by  the  German  Ambassador  was  finally  issued  to 
the  press  without  the  suspicious  expression  concerning  the  solidarity 
and  the  friendly  spirit:  "Cette  redaction,  volontairement  terne, 
evitait  une  solidarite  I'Allemagne  qui  pourrait  etre  mal  interpretee 
("this  purposely  colorless  editing  avoided  a  solidarity  with 
Germany  which  might  be  falsely  interpreted.")  So  to  be  read  in 
a  circular  note  which  the  French  Foreign  Office  addressed  to  its 
foreign  embassies  concerning  this  important  case.  ("Yellow  Book," 
No.  62.)  The  same  circular  note  adds  that  the  probable  explana- 
tion of  Herr  von  Schoen's  step  was  that  he  was  seeking  to  compro- 
mise France  in  the  eyes  of  Russia  ("a  compromettre  la  France  au 


24       Germany's  Case  in  the  Swpreme  Court  of  Civilization 

regard  de  la  Eussie/')  The  French  Foreign  Minister,  p.  i.,  announces 
in  a  further  circular  note  of  July  29  his  pride  that  the  German 
Ambassador  had  sought  in  vain  to  draw  Germany  into  a  Franco- 
German  action  toward  solidarity  in  St.  Petersburg,  (^^^a  vainement 
tente  de  mous  entrainer  dans  une  action  solidarie  franco-allemande 
a  Petersbourg.")  He  repeats  the  assertion  that  the  Kussian  Govern- 
ment had  given  the  greatest  proofs  of  its  moderation  and  that 
Eussia  in  no  way  threatened  the  peace,  but  that  on  the  other  hand 
negotiations  must  be  conducted  in  Vienna  and  that  all  danger 
emanated  from  Vienna.     (^'Yellow  Book,"  No.  85.) 

From  no  document  of  the  French  "Yellow  Book,"  and  as  little 
from  the  Eussian  "Orange  Book"  and  the  English  "Blue  Book," 
does  it  appear  that  France  at  any  stage  ventured  to  give  the  Eussian 
Government  an  earnest  counsel  in  a  pacific  sense,  unless  it  be  con- 
sidered that  the  expression  of  the  wish  that  Eussia  might  avoid 
measures  which  could  give  Germany  a  pretext  for  mobilization 
("Yellow  Book,"  No.  102)  be  regarded  as  a  sincere  mediation  for 
peace,  while  as  a  matter  of  fact  such  wishes  are  more  properly  to 
be  regarded  as  tactical  hints  to  detain  Germany  until  the  assurance 
of  armed  help  from  England,  toward  which  France  was  at  that 
time  working  with  all  means  at  its  disposal,  should  be  attained. 

The  unconditional  safeguarding  of  the  English  alliance,  not 
any  mediatory  activity  whatsoever,  was  in  those  critical  days  the 
goal  of  the  labors  of  French  diplomats;  and  as  long  as  this  goal 
was  not  attained,  the  decisive  word  to  Eussia  was  also  not  uttered. 
No  matter  if  the  impression  is  given  a  hundred  times  in  the  French 
"Yellow  Book"  that  French  assistance  of  Eussia  was  axiomatic, 
so  axiomatic  that  a  special  declaration  on  this  point  to  Eussia — 
which  one  seeks  in  vain  in  the  French  "Yellow  Book" — was  not  at 
all  necessary — ^but  the  Eussian  "Orange  Book"  knows  better.  In 
this  there  is  contained  a  telegraphic  statement  of  Sazonof  to 
Isvolsky,  printed  as  of  June  29,  ("Orange  Book,"  No.  58,)  and  that, 
too,  as  the  last  of  the  ten  documents  dated  July  29,  so  that  we 
may  assume  that  this  telegram  was  dispatched  only  late  in  the 
evening  of  July  29.    In  the  statement  Isvolsky  is  authorized 

d'exprimer  au  Gouvernement  frangaise  notre  sincere  reconnaissance 
pour  la  declaration  que  TAmbassadeur  de  France  m'a  faite  en  son 
nom  en  disant  que  nous  pouvons  compter  entierement  sur  I'appui  de 
notre  alliee  la  France  (to  express  to  the  French  Government  our  sin- 
cere gratitude  for  the   declaration  which  the  French   Ambassador  has 


Germany^ s  Case  in  the  Supreme  Court  of  Civilization       25 

made  to  me  in  its  name,  that  we  may  count  upon  the  full  and  complete 
support  of  France  as  our  ally.) 

Sazonof  added: 

Dans  les  circonstances  actuelles  cette  declaration  nous  est  particu- 
lierement  precieuse  (under  the  present  circumstances  this  declaration  is 
especially  precious  to  us.) 

From  this  it  appears  that  France  on  the  evening  of  July  29, 
not  earlier  and  not  later,  gave  to  Russia  expressly  and  without  con- 
ditions its  declaration  of  armed  assistance. 

Why  not  earlier?  And  why  did  France  on  July  29  find  the 
ability  to  make  up  its  mind  to  this  decisive  step? 

The  key  lies  with 

England. 

The  relation  of  France  to  England  bears,  since  1905,  the  official 
name  of  the  '^entente  cordiale."  A  good  understanding,  not  an 
alliance.  In  the  English  Parliament,  the  Ministers  responsible  for 
the  foreign  policy  have  always  declared  that  there  existed  no  treaty 
obligation  whatsoever  for  the  cordial  good  understanding  between 
the  two  nations;  for  England  there  was  said  to  be  no  binding 
obligation;  Parliament's  power  of  decision  was  said  to  have  been 
encroached  upon  in  advance  in  no  way. 

Today  we  know  more. 

Between  Sir  Edward  Grey  as  Secretary  of  State  of  the  British 
Foreign  Office  and  M.  Paul  Cambon  as  Ambassador  of  the  French 
Republic  letters  were  exchanged  on  November  22  and  23,  1912,  of 
which  the  letter  of  Grey — w^iich  Paul  Cambon  merely  confirms  in 
approximately  the  same  words — may  here  be  inserted.  (^'Blue 
Book,"  No.  105,  Annex  1:) 

Foreign  OflSce,  Nov.  22,  1912. 

My  dear  Ambassador: 

From  time  to  time  in  recent  years  the  French  and  British  naval 
and  military  experts  have  consulted  together.  It  has  always  been 
understood  that  such  consultation  does  not  restrict  the  freedom  of  either 
Government  to  decide  at  any  future  time  whether  or  not  to  assist  the 
other  by  armed  force.  We  have  agreed  that  consultation  between 
experts  is  not,  and  ought  not  to  be  regarded  as  an  engagement  that 
commits  either  Government  to  action  in  a  contingency  that  has  not 
arisen    and    may    never    arise.      The    disposition,    for    instance,    of    the 

m 


26       Germany^ s  Case  in  the  Supreme  Court  of  Civilization 

French  and  British  fleets  respectively  at  the  present  moment  is  not 
based  upon   an  engagement  to   cooperate  in  war. 

You  have,  however,  pointed  out  that  if  either  Government  had  grave 
reason  to  expect  an  unprovoked  attack  by  a  third  Power,  it  might 
become  essential  to  know  whether  it  could  in  that  event  depend  upon 
the  armed  assistance  of  the  other. 

I  agree  that,  if  either  Government  had  grave  reason  to  expect  an 
unprovoked  attack  by  a  third  Power,  or  something  that  threatened  the 
general  peace,  it  should  immediately  discuss  with  the  other  whether  both 
Governments  should  act  together  to  prevent  aggression  and  to  preserve 
the  peace,  and,  if  so,  what  measures  they  would  be  prepared  to  take 
in  common.  If  these  measures  involved  action,  the  plans  of  the  Gen- 
eral Staffs  would  at  once  be  taken  into  consideration  and  the  Govern- 
ments would  then  decide  what  effect  should  be  given  to  them.  Yours, 
&c.  E.  GREY. 


This  liistorical  document  shows  that  the  British  and  French 
army  and  admiralty  staffs  had  worked  out  and  agreed  upon  plans 
for  joint  action  hy  land  and  sea.  There  could  be  no  doubt  as  to 
who  was  the  sole  opponent  against  whom  these  plans  were  to  be 
directed.  The  plans  made  in  common  were  kept  alive  by  regularly 
recurring  conferences  between  the  English  and  French  military  and 
naval  authorities.  The  details  for  effecting  joint  action  of  the  land 
and  sea  forces  of  both  sides  were  not  formulated,  but  the  decision 
of  the  question  whether  or  not  there  was  to  be  such  joint  action  was 
left  for  the  moment  when  an  emergency  should  arise. 

Thus  the  English  Government  was  justified  in  maintaining 
that  she  had  made  no  actual  alliance  with  France.  But  it  is  clear 
that  the  arrangement  of  operations  in  common  between  two  great 
powers  and  the  continuous  consultation  regarding  such  plans  of 
operation  cannot  be  a  mere  way  of  passing  the  time.  Even  if 
nothing  else  is  taken  into  consideration  but  the  intimate  knowledge 
which  each  must  obtain  of  the  strength  of  the  other,  it  is  clear  that 
such  conduct  can  be  possible  only  if  both  sides  are  seriously  con- 
sidering acting  together.  To  throw  more  light  on  the  actual  mean- 
ing of  the  correspondence — in  itself  not  binding — attention  may 
also  be  called  to  the  fact  that  France,  trusting  to  the  plan  of 
operations  agreed  upon  with  England,  concentrated  her  fleet  in  the 
Mediterranean  and  left  the  protection  of  her  channel  and  Atlantic 
seaboard  to  the  English  fleet.  Was  not  England  at  least  morally 
bound  by  this  very  definite  fact? 


Germany's  Case  in  the  Supreme  Court  of  Civilization       27 

Grey's  Early  Moves. 

Sophists  try  to  deceive  not  only  others  but  themselves.  Sir 
Edward  Grey,  at  the  beginning  of  the  conflict,  seems  to  have  tried 
to  make  himself  believe  that  he  possessed  a  freedom  which  he  really 
did  not.  Only  by  bearing  this  in  mind  can  one  explain  his  taking 
upon  himself  tlie  role — foredoomed  to  failure — of  wishing  to  be  a 
mediator  in  a  case  to  which  he  was  in  reality  a  party. 

Whether  he  wished  it  or  not,  this  dual  attitude  was  bound  to 
lead  to  insincerity. 

All  one  has  to  do  is  to  refer  to  the  English  "Blue  Book/'  No.  1 7, 
in  order  to  see  how  Sir  G.  Buchanan,  on  July  25th,  answered  Mr. 
Sazonof's  urging  that  England  make  clear  that  it  stood  with  France 
and  Eussia : 

I  said  that  Euglaud  could  play  the  role  of  mediator  at  Berlin  and 
Vienna  to  better  purpose  as  a  friend  who,  if  her  counsels  of  modera- 
tion were  disregarded,  might  one  da^  be  converted  into  an  ally,  than 
if  she  were  to  declare  herself  Kussia's  ally  at  once. 

Such  a  mediator  can  certainly  not  be  called  an  "honest  broker." 
In  addition  to  the  fact  that  Sir  Edward  Grey,  on  account  of 
his  entente  position  toward  France  and  also  toward  Russia,  had 
not  the  impartiality  and  inner  freedom  which  alone  could  have 
qualified  him  for  the  role  he  desired  of  mediator  and  judge  in  the 
Serbian  dispute — a  role  which  he  had  already  played  in  other  dis- 
putes— he  was,  granting  the  sincerity  of  his  peaceful  inclinations, 
in  a  difficult  position  toward  his  colleagues  in  the  Cabinet,  whose 
attitude  toward  the  question  of  peace  or  war  was  not  unanimous, 
as  was  proved  later  to  the  entire  world  by  the  retirement  of  the 
three  friends  of  peace. 

At  first  Sir  Edward  made  some  resistance  to  the  urging  of 
Russia  and  France  for  an  immediate  declaration  of  solidarity.  He 
thoroughly  approved  of  the  explanations  given  on  July  24  by 
Buchanan  to  Sazonof,  of  which  the  most  important  was  the  one  to 
the  effect  that  England  could  scarcely  agree  to  being  unconditionally 
bound  to  give  France  and  Russia  armed  support,  because  public 
opinion  in  England  would  not  sanction  a  war  on  account  of  Serbia 
("Blue  Book,"  No.  6.)     In  fact,  he  expressly  states: 

I  do  not  consider  that  public  opinion  here  would  or  ought  to  sanc- 
tion our  going  to  war  over  a  Serbian  quarrel.     ("Blue  Book,*'  No.  24.) 


28       GerTTiany^s  Case  in  the  Supreme  Court  of  Civilization 

England^s  position  had  a  most  disagreeable  effect  in  St.  Peters- 
burg and  Paris,  as  was  shown,  not  in  the  documents  made  public 
at  that  time,  but  in  the  statements  of  the  press. 

Kussian  and  French  diplomacy  sought  to  influence  Sir  Edward 
Grey  by  the  assertion  that  the  peril  lay  in  the  fact  that  the  German 
Government  might  consider  it  a  foregone  conclusion  that  England 
would  not  intervene ;  that,  as  soon  as  England  should  determinedly 
support  Russia  and  France,  Germany  would  bring  pressure  to  bear 
on  Austria-Hungary,  and,  in  this  way,  the  danger  of  war  would 
be  averted  ("Blue  Book,"  No.  17.)  Even  as  late  as  July  27  Sir 
G.  Buchanan  answered  Mr.  Sazonof  on  the  subject  of  this  ever- 
recurring  line  of  argument,  in  a  thoroughly  pertinent  manner,  by 
saying  that  he  was  mistaken  if  he  thought  such  a  course  would  help 
the  cause  of  peace ;  that,  by  such  a  threat,  Germany's  attitude  would 
merely  be  stiffened.     ("Blue  Book,"  No.  44.) 

While  the  English  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg  was  stating 
only  what  was  self-evident,  namely,  that  an  English  threat  against 
Germany  would  both  fail  of  its  intended  effect  and  make  the 
critical  situation  even  worse,  London  began  to  yield  to  the  pressure 
of  France  and  Russia. 

First,  Sir  Edward  Grey  lent  ear  to  Paul  Cambon's  plan  of  a 
conference,  expressed  in  the  following  form :  the  British  Cabinet 
was  to  request  the  German  Government  "to  take  the  initiative  in 
offering  at  Vienna  mediation  between  Austria  and  Serbia  by  the 
four  powers  not  directly  interested.  ("Yellow  Book,"  No.  32.) 
This  project  was  futile  from  the  very  start,  since  it  not  only  pre- 
supposed Germany's  taking  an  initiative  toward  her  ally  which 
France  had  refused  with  alarm  to  take  toward  Russia,  but  also 
ignored  the  fact  that  Austria-Hungary  was  known  to  have  taken 
the  stand  that  intervention  or  mediation  of  third  parties  in  her 
conflict  with  Serbia  could  not  be  accepted.  Austria-Hungary, 
moreover,  by  accepting  the  Grey-Cambon  proposal,  would  thereby 
have  recognized  Russia  as  a  power  directly  interested  in  the  con- 
flict between  Austria-Hungary  and  Serbia,  which  was  diametrically 
opposed  to  Austro-Hungarian  conceptions  and  intentions.  Paul 
Cambon,  however,  by  luring  Sir  Edward  Grey  onto  this  thin  ic^ 
succeeded,  in  view  of  the  fact  that  Germany's  refusal  of  the  pro- 
posal was  beyond  doubt,  in  making  the  attitude  of  the  English 
Cabinet  toward  Germany  more  unfriendly. 

Besides,   a  certain  amount  of  encouragement  to   France  and 


Germany^  s  Case  in  the  Supreme  Court  of  .Civilization       29 

Russia  emanated  from  the  British  Government.  What  influences 
were  at  work  there  is  shown  by  the  agreement  between  two  telegrams 
("Yellow  Book/'  Nos.  63  and  (j(S)  which  the  French  Charge  d' Af- 
faires in  London  sent  to  his  Government  on  July  27th. 

No.  63. 

London,  July  27,  1914. 

The  German  and  Austro-Hungarian  Ambassadors  give  it  to  be 
understood  that  they  are  certain  that  England  will  observe  neutrality 
if  a  conflict  break  out.  Sir  Arthur  Nicolson  told  me  that  Prince  Lich- 
nowsky,  however,  after  the  conversation  he  had  with  him  today,  could 
not  preserve  any  doubt  as  to  the  liberty  of  intervention  which  the 
British  Government  intends  to  keep,  should  it  deem  intervention 
necessary. 

The  German  Ambassador  cannot  have  failed  to  be  struck  by  this 
declaration,  but,  so  as  to  bring  pressure  upon  Germany,  and  so  as  to 
avoid  a  conflict,  it  appears  indispensable  that  Germany  should  be  led 
to  hold  it  for  certain  that  she  would  find  England  and  Eussia  by  the 
side  of  France. 

No.  66. 

London,  July   27,   1914. 

Sir  Edward  Grey  this  morning  told  the  German  Ambassador  that  if 
Austria  invaded  Serbia  after  the  Serbian  reply,  she  would  prove  that 
she  was  not  merely  seeking  a  settlement  of  the  questions  mentioned 
in  her  note  of  July  23,  but  that  she  wished  to  crush  a  small  State. 
''Then,"  he  added,  ''a  European  question  would  be  raised  and  a  war 
would  ensue  in  which  all  the  powers  would  take  part."  The  attitude 
of  Great  Britain  is  defined  by  the  stoppage  of  the  demobilization  of 
her  fleet.  The  First  Lord  of  the  Admiralty  on  Friday  already  discreetly 
took  this  step  on  his  own  initiative.  Tonight  Sir  Edward  Grey  and 
his  colleagues  decided  to  publish  this  news.  This  result  is  due  to  the 
conciliatory  attitude  of  Serbia  and  Russia. 

Attention  is  called  to  the  nuances  in  the  statements  of  Grey 
and  Nicolson  to  the  French  Charge  d' Affaires:  Nicolson  claims  to 
have  given  the  German  Ambassador  explanations  which  should  have 
left  no  doubt  in  the  latter's  mind  that  England  reserved  her  free- 
dom to  interfere.  Grey  claims  only  to  have  spoken  '^other  powers" 
might  also  take  part  in  a  war.     (Note  4.) 


[Note  4. — The  French  Government  had  an  English  translation  made 
of  its  ''Yellow  Book"  by  The  London  Times  and  declared  explicitly 
on  the  title  page  that  this  translation  was  "authorized."  In  this 
translation  the  following: 

"une  guerre  a  laquelle  d 'antes  Puissances  seraient  amenees  a  prendre 
part, ' ' 


30       Germany's  Case  in  the  Supreme  Court  of  Civilization 

But  of  more  importance  than  this  difference  between  the  more 
emphatic  tone  of  Nicolson,  known  as  one  of  the  fathers  of  the 
Russian-English  rapprochement,  and  the  milder  tone  of  Grey,  is 
the  fact  that  the  First  Lord  of  the  Admiralty,  on  his  own  initiative, 
and  early  as  July  24,  postponed  the  dispersal  of  the  fleet  which  had 
been  gathered  for  maneuvers;  and  still  more  important  is  the  fact 
that,  on  July  27,  Sir  Edward  Grey  felt  called  upon  to  announce 
this  measure,  kept  secret  up  to  then,  to  the  French  Charge  d' Af- 
faires, as  a  consequence  of  the  good  relations  between  Russia  and 
Serbia,  Grey  also  informed  the  Russian  Ambassador  of  this  on  the 
same  day,  and  communicated  the  following  on  the  subject  to 
Buchanan : 

I  have  been  told  by  the  Kussian  Ambassador  that  in  German  and 
Austrian  circles  impression  prevails  that  in  any  event  we  would  stand 
aside.  His  Excellency  deplored  the  effect  that  such  an  impression 
must  produce.  This  impression  ought,  as  I  have  pointed  out,  to  be 
dispelled  by  the  orders  we  have  given  to  the  First  Fleet,  which  is 
concentrated,  as  it  happens,  at  Portland,  not  to  disperse  for  maneuver 
leave.  But  I  explained  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  that  my  reference 
to  it  must  not  be  taken  to  mean  that  anything  more  than  diplomatic 
action  was  promised.     (''Blue  Book,"  No.  47.) 

One  can  imagine  what  inferences  the  Russian  and  French 
Governments  drew  from  the  continued  state  of  mobilization  of  the 
English  North  Sea  fleet,  and  from  the  announcement  of  this 
measure,  despite  the  reservation  with  which  Sir  Edward  Grey 
deemed  it  best  to  impart  the  information.  The  action  of  the  First 
Lord  of  the  Admiralty  and  the  sanctioning  and  announcement  of 
that  action  by  the  British  Cabinet  carried  more  weight  than  all 
cautious  statements. 

During  the  following  two  days  the  war  party  in  the  English 
Cabinet  must  have  won  the  upper  hand  even  more;  for,  on  July 


is  translated: 

"a  war  in  which  all  the  powers  would  take  part"; 

Thus,  the  original  French  version,  ''a  war  in  which  other  powers 
might  be  led  to  take  part," 

was  translated,  with  the  authorization  of  the  French  Government, 
into: 

"a  war  in  which  all  powers  would  take  part." 

By  this  retouching,  and  for  obvious  reasons,  a  clearness  of  speech 
is  attributed  to  Sir  Edward  Grey  on  July  27  which  in  reality  he  did 
not  find  until  later.] 


Germany's  Case  in  the  Supreme  Court  of  Civilization       31 

29,  Sir  Edward  Grey  took  a  step  which  could  leave  no  doubt  as  to 
England's  being  on  the  side  of  her  associates  in  the  Entente.  On 
that  day  Grey  had  a  conference  with  Prince  Lichnowsky  concerning 
which  he  himself  informed  the  English  Ambassador  at  Berlin 
("Blue  Book/'  No.  89)  : 

After  speaking  to  the  German  Ambassador  this  afternoon  about  the 
European  situation,  I  said  that  I  wished  to  say  to  him,  in  a  quite 
private  and  friendly  way,  something  that  was  on  my  mind.  The  situa- 
tion was  very  grave.  While  it  was  restricted  to  the  issues  at  present 
actually  involved  we  had  no  thought  of  interfering  in  it.  But  if  Ger- 
many became  involved  in  it,  and  then  France,  the  issue  might  be  so 
great  that  it  would  involve  European  interests;  and  I  did  not  wish  him 
to  be  misled  by  the  friendly  tone  of  our  conversation — which  I  hoped 
would  continue — in  thinking  that  we  should  stand  aside. 

This  announcement  left  nothing  to  be  desired  so  far  as  clear- 
ness was  concerned. 

Now  clearness  in  difficult  situations  may  be  an  advantage  and 
lead  to  disentanglement.  But  if  that  was  the  object  of  Sir  Edward 
Grey,  what  evil  spirit  prompted  him  to  say  to  the  French  Ambas- 
sador on  the  morning  of  July  29  that  he  would  summon  the 
German  Ambassador  and  make  this  "quite  private  and  friendly" 
announcement  to  him ! 

Die  Cast  for  War. 

Sir  Edward  Grey  himself  informs  the  English  Ambassador  at 
Paris  that  he  had  acted  thus  ("Blue  Book/'  No.  29)  : 

After  telling  M.  Cambon  today  how  grave  the  situation  seemed  to 
be,  I  told  him  that  I  meant  to  tell  the  German  Ambassador  today  that 
he  must  not  be  misled  by  the  friendly  tone  of  our  conversations  into 
any  sense  of  false  security  that  we  should  stand  aside  if  all  the  efforts 
to  preserve  the  peace,  which  we  were  now  making  in  common  with 
Germany,  failed. 

With  that  France  must  have  felt  sure  that  she  could  count  on 
the  armed  support  of  England,  in  case  she  might  in  any  way  be 
drawn  into  the  conflict.  One  seeks  in  vain  in  the  French  "Yellow 
Book"  for  a  dispatch  from  Paul  Cambon  concerning  this  most  im- 
portant negotiation  during  the  entire  critical  week;  one  also  seeks 
there  in  vain  for  the  instructions  concerning  it  given  in  Paris  to 
St.  Petersburg.  But  the  bullet  shot  from  London  on  July  29 
appears  on  the  evening  of  the  same  day  in  St.  Petersburg,  in  the 
telegram  wherein  Sazonof  commissions  Isvolsky  to  express  to  the 


32       Germany^ s  Case  in  the  Supreme  Court  of  Civilization 

French  Government  the  sincere  gratitude  of  the  Eussian  Govern- 
ment for  the  declaration  of  unconditional  armed  support. 
(''Orange  Book/'  No.  58.) 

Now  the  die  had  been  cast  for  war.  As  early  as  July  25 
Sazonof  had  declared  to  the  English  Ambassador:  "If  Eussia 
feels  secure  of  the  support  of  France,  she  will  face  all  the  risks  of 
war,"  ("Blue  Book/'  No.  17.)  Matters  then  had  come  to  this 
pass,  thanks  to  the  certainty,  reached  at  last,  that  the  entry  of 
France  into  the  war  would  cause  England  to  break  loose,  France 
had  promised  armed  support  to  Eussia,  and,  in  connection  there- 
with, doubtless  observed  that  English  aid  could  also  be  counted 
upon.     (Note  5.) 

To  his  report  to  Paul  Cambon  regarding  his  contemplated 
announcement  to  Prince  Lichnowsky,  Sir  Edward  Grey  added  some 
statements  which  at  first  sight  seem  to  be  somewhat  analogous  to 
the  reservation  made  by  him  when  he  announced  to  the  Eussian 
Ambassador  the  continued  state  of  mobilization  of  the  English 
fleet.  He  pointed  out  that  public  opinion  in  England  looked  upon 
the  difhculties  of  that  time  in  a  different  way  from  that  in  which 
they  had  looked  upon  the  Morocco  crisis.  Then  it  had  seemed  as 
if  Germany  wished  to  crush  France  on  account  of  a  question  which 
was  the  substance  of  a  special  agreement  between  England  and 
France.  But  now  the  question  dealt  primarily  with  a  question  be- 
tween Serbia  and  Austria-Hungary,  perhaps  also  with  one  between 
Eussia  and  Germany,  and  England  felt  no  call  to  interfere.  And 
even  if  France  were  drawn  in  on  account  of  her  duties  as  an  ally, 
England  had  not  as  yet  decided  what  was  to  be  done;  the  matter 
was  one  that  must  be  reflected  upon;  England  was  untrammeled 
by  obligations  and  must  decide  what  was  to  the  advantage  of  British 
interests;  that  he  had  felt  it  necessary  to  say  this  in  order  not  to 
let  Cambon  harbor  the  belief  that  a  decision  had  been  arrived  at 
regarding  this  point. 


[Note  5, — A  report  captured  in  Germany  after  the  outbreak  of  war 
from  the  Belgian  Charge  d 'Affaires  at  St.  Petersburg,  M.  de  I'Escaille, 
dated  July  30,  contains  full  confirmation  of  this  interconnection.  This 
report  reads:  ''England  first  gave  to  understand  that  she  would  not 
allow  herself  to  be  drawn  into  a  conflict.  Sir  G.  Buchanan  said  this 
openly.  Today  (on  July  30)  St.  Petersburg  is  firmly  convinced,  and 
has  even  received  assurances  thereof,  that  England  will  line  up  with 
France.  This  help  is  of  decisive  importance  and  has  contributed 
materially  to  the  triumph  of   tfce  war  party."] 


Germany* s  Case  in  the  Supreme  Court  of  Civilization      33 

How  Cambon  took  this  is  shown  by  his  answer.  Sir  Edward 
Grey  himself  wires  concerning  this  to  the  British  Ambassador  at 
Paris,  ("Blue  Book,"  No.  87)  : 

M.  Cambon  said  that  I  had  explained  the  situation  very  clearly. 
He  understood  it  to  be  that  in  a  Balkan  quarrel,  and  in  a  struggle  for 
supremacy  between  Teuton  and  Slav,  we  should  not  feel  called  to 
intervene;  should  other  issues  be  raised,  and  Germany  and  France 
become  involved,  so  that  the  question  became  one  of  the  hegemony  of 
Europe,  we  should  then  decide  what  it  was  necessary  for  us  to  do. 

In  fact  M.  Cambon  fully  understood  Sir  Edward  Grey,  even 
regarding  that  which  he  did  not  state,  viz. :  the  English  Cabinet, 
in  view  of  public  opinion,  needs  another  reason  for  interference 
beside  a  Serbian- Austro-Hungarian  or  Eussian- German  conflict; 
such  reason  can  and  must  be  provided.  At  all  events  England 
looks  upon  a  conflict  in  which  Germany  and  France  are  also  arrayed 
against  each  other  as  a  question  involving  the  hegemony  of  Europe, 
in  which  the  decisions  still  to  be  made  by  the  English  Government 
become  clear. 

The  intelligent  M.  Cambon  did  not  delay  then,  after  assurances 
of  French  armed  support  to  Russia  had  been  given  as  a  result  of 
this  interview  with  Sir  Edward  Grey,  in  seeking  other  issues  for 
the  spreading  conflagration.  On  the  next  day,  July  30,  he  pre- 
sented to  Sir  Edward  Grey  the  correspondence  of  November,  1912, 
accompanied  by  a  notice  of  the  Paris  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs 
regarding  alleged  German  preparations  for  war  on  the  German- 
French  frontier,  (Note  6)  and  with  his  characteristic  penetration 
he  foresaw  that  Germany  would  now  attack  France,  either  by  de- 
manding the  cessation  of  French  preparations  for  war,  or  by  de- 
manding a  declaration  of  neutrality  from  France  in  the  event  of  a 
German-Eussian  war.  France  would  have  to  reject  both  of  these. 
("Blue  Book,"  No.  105.) 

Criticises  Sir  Edward  Grey. 

Thus  a  threatening  attack  on  France  and  an  imperiling  of 
European  peace,  the  two  assumed  situations  in  which,  should  they 


[Note  6. — This  notice,  in  the  form  in  which  it  has  been  made  public 
in  the  English  ''Blue  Book,"  must  have  been  fabricated  subsequently, 
for  the  reasons  stated  hereinbefore  in  Note  1.] 


34       Germany^s  Case  in  the  Suprerne  Court  of  Civilization 

occur,  England  and  France  had  agreed  to  decide  whether  or  not 
they  should  act  jointly  with  land  and  sea  forces,  had  indeed  arisen, 
according  to  the  view  of  the  French  Government.  After  the  inter- 
view on  July  29  between  Grey  and  Cambon  the  decision  of  the 
English  Cabinet  could  no  longer  be  in  doubt. 

Did  Sir  Edward  Grey  know  that  on  July  29  the  French  Govern- 
ment offered  Kussia  her  unconditional  support,  with  which  Russia 
was  resolved  to  run  all  the  risks  of  a  war?  If  so,  had  he  any 
thought  of  succeeding  when,  on  July  30,.  he  telegraphed  to 
Buchanan  that  he  urgently  recommend  to  the  Russian  Govern- 
ment the  project  for  mediation  emanating  from  the  interview  with 
the  German  Ambassador?  If  Sir  Edward  Grey  was  in  earnest 
here  in  his  attempt  to  reach  an  understanding  at  the  last  moment 
on  this  basis,  and  if  he  really  sincerely  welcomed  the  admission 
secured  from  Count  Berchtold  through  the  intervention  of  the 
German  Emperor  that  he  would  discuss  with  Russia  the  ultima- 
tum to  Serbia,  what  feelings  must  have  been  aroused  in  him  by 
the  fact  that  the  Russian  Government,  in  spite  of  the  possibilities 
of  peace  yet  existing  and  of  his  own  urging,  ordered  general  mobili- 
zation on  July  31,  thus  making  inevitable  a  war  to  which,  in  accord- 
ance with  all  that  had  gone  before,  England  must  also  be  a  party? 

If  the  sudden  and  unprecedentedly  grave  step  by  Russia  aroused 
any  feelings  at  all  in  Sir  Edward  Grey,  one  must  acknowledge  that 
he  was  able  to  master  them.  At  all  events  there  is  no  trace,  of  any 
such  feelings  in  the  ''Blue  Book,'^  nor  any  trace  of  remonstrance 
against  Russia's  step  which  spoiled  everything,  nor  of  any  endeavor 
to  plead  with  Russia  that  she  cease  the  mobilization  which  had 
been  ordered  or  make  satisfactory  explanations  to  Germany. 

On  the  contrary  Grey  made  the  attempt,  hopeless  from  the  start, 
of  continuing  the  negotiations  and  keeping  mobilized  Germany 
quiet.  This  last  was  refused  by  Germany.  Secretary  of  State  von 
Jag-ow  declared  to  Sir  E.  Goschen  that  Russia  said  that  her 
mobilization  did  not  necessarily  mean  war,  since  Russia  could  well 
remain  some  months  in  a  state  of  mobilization  without  waging  war, 
but  that  this  was  not  the  case  with  Germany,  that  Germany's  ad- 
vantage was  speed,  Russia's  numbers,  and  the  security  of  Germany 
forbade  her  to  allow  Russia  to  collect  her  masses  of  troops  from  all 
parts  of  her  great  Empire  ("Blue  Book,"  No.  138.) 

Moreover,  now  that  the  die  had  been  cast.  Sir  Edward  Grey 
concentrated  his  endeavors  upon  playing  his  cards  in  such  a  way 


Gerviany'' s  Case  in  tlie  Supreme  Court  of  Civilization       35 

tliat  an  occasion  should  be  provided  for  the  immediate  entry  of 
England  into  the  war,  which  should  appear  conclusive  to  the  still 
reluctant  part  of  the  English  Cabinet  and  of  English  public 
opinion. 

The  "Blue"  and  ^'Yellow"  books  together  show  that  Grey,  who 
had  been  as  closely  bound  morally  as  it  is  possible  to  be  to  Paul 
Cambon  since  the  29th  of  July,  found  some  difficulty  in  persuading 
the  Enorlish  Cabinet  that  the  mere  entrv  of  France  into  the  war 
was  sufficient  reason  for  the  active  participation  of  England.  It  was 
clear  that  there  was  not  sufficient  support  in  the  English  Cabinet 
for  Cambon's  view  that  a  war  in  which  France  and  Germany  were 
involved  meant  a  light  for  the  hegemony  of  Europe  to  which  Eng- 
land could  not  remain  indifferent — :a  view  to  which  Grey  had  not 
demurred  (see  above.) 

The  embarrassment  of  Grey  was  increased  by  very  far-reaching 
assurances  which  Germany  held  out  for  tlie  event  of  a  declaration 
of  neutrality  by  England.  On  July  29,  when  the  ^'friendly  and 
private"  statements  of  Grey  to  Prince  Lichnowsky  were  as  yet  un- 
known in  Berlin,  the  Imperial  Chancellor  made  a  proposal  to  Sir 
E.  Goschen  which  was  calculated  to  make  British  neutrality  possible. 
C^Blue  Book,"  Xo.  85.)  The  Chancellor  pointed  out  that  a  Russian 
attack  on  Austria-Hungary  would  probably  lead  to  a  European 
conflagration,  since  Germany  was  bound  to  give  armed  support  to 
her  ally.  The  Chancellor  added  that  it  was  clear  to  him  that 
England  would  not  view  with  indifference  any  possible  conflict 
in  which  France  was  to  be  destroyed,  but  that  the  destruction  of 
France  was  not  Germany's  aim,  and,  provided  that  English  neu- 
trality were  assured,  all  possible  assurances  could  be  given  the 
British  Government  that  Germany  contemplated  absolutely  no  ter- 
ritorial increase  at  the  expense  of  France,  even  if  Germany  emerged 
victorious  from  such  a  war.  The  Chancellor  refused,  after  a  request 
by  Goschen,  to  make  a  like  assurance  regarding  the  French  colonies, 
a  refusal  which  later  was  not  maintained.  The  Chancellor  declared 
further  that  Germany  would  respect  the  neutrality  of  Holland  so 
long  as  it  should  be  respected  by  others,  and,  as  for  Belgium,  what- 
ever operations  Germany  might  be  obliged  to  undertake  there  would 
depend  on  how  France  acted,  but  that,  after  the  war,  Belgium's 
integrity  would  be  respected,  provided  that  Belgium  had  not  taken 
up  arms  against  Germany. 

This  offer  was  most  peremptorily  rejected  by  Sir  Edward  Grey, 


36       Germany's  Case  in  the  Supreme  Court  of  Civilization 

("Blue  Book/^  No.  101.)     Goschen  was  instructed  to  inform  the 
Chancellor  respecting  the  assurances  regarding  France : 

It  would  be  a  disgrace  for  us  to  make  this  bargain  with  Germany 
at  the  expense  of  France,  a  disgrace  from  which  the  good  name  of  this 
country  would  never  recover. 

He  added  that  it  was  likewise  out  of  the  question  that  England 
should  bargain  regarding  her  duties  and  interests  in  connection 
with  Belgian  neutrality. 

The  vehemence  of  expression  in  the  refusal  of  the  German  pro- 
posal is  significant:  Sir  Edward  Grey  looked  upon  himself  as  an 
ally  of  France  who  was  to  be  tempted  to  break  faith.  But  he  was 
determined  to  make  of  Belgian  neutrality  the  issue  which  he  needed 
in  order  to  bring  the  Cabinet  and  public  opinion  into  the  war. 

No.  113  of  the  "Blue  Book"  contains  the  telegram  from  St. 
Petersburg  concerning  the  order  for  general  mobilization  of 
Russians  forces. 

No.  114  of  the  "Blue  Book"  contains  a  telegram,  of  Sir  Edward 
Grey  to  the  Ambassadors  at  Berlin  and  Paris,  reading  as  follows : 

Foreign  Oflace,  July  31,  1914. 

I  still  trust  that  situation  is  not  irretrievable,  but  in  view  of  pros- 
pect of  mobilization  in  Germany  it  becomes  essential  to  his  Majesty's 
Government,  in  view  of  existing  treaties,  to  ask  whether  French  (Ger- 
man) Government  is  prepared  to  engage  to  respect  neutrality  of  Bel- 
gium so  long  as  no  other  power  violates  it. 

Thus  Grey's  answer  to  the  Russian  mobilization  was  not  a  step 
in  St.  Petersburg  but  the  raising  of  the  question  of  Belgian  neu- 
trality in  Berlin — in  Paris  the  question  was  self-evidently  a  farce — 
in  order  to  create  the  pretext  for  England's  intervention. 

In  fact,  it  was  high  time  for  something  to  happen  in  this  direc- 
tion, for  the  French  Ambassador,  who  had  acted  immediately  upon 
the  fateful  statement  of  Grey  on  July  29,  and  irrevocably  committed 
France,  and  who  had  presented  the  correspondence  of  November, 
1912,  to  Sir  Edward  Grey  on  July  30,  and  asked  for  its  acceptance, 
became  impatient  when  Sir  Edward,  forced  by  a  Cabinet  decision, 
made  excuses.  Grey  telegraphed  on  July  31  to  the  English  Am- 
bassador in  Paris  ("Blue  Book,"  No.  114)  that  Paul  Cambon  had 
shown  a  telegram  of  Jules  Cambon  from  Berlin — evidently  a  put-up 
job — according  to  which   Germany  had  been  encouraged  by  the 


Germany*s  Case  in  the  Supreme  Court  of  Civilization       37 

uncertainty  as  to  England's  intervention.  Sir  Edward  protested 
and  told  Paul  Cambon  that  he  had,  on  that  same  morning,  definitely 
refused  in  the  presence  of  the  German  Ambassador  to  make  any 
declarations  of  neutrality  and  had  even  stated  that,  if  Germany 
and  France  became  involved  in  a  war,  England  would  be  drawn 
into  it ;  but  that  this,  however,  was  not  to  be  construed  as  meaning 
an  agreement  with  France.  He  told  Paul  Cambon  further  that  the 
Cabinet  had  decided  that  it  could  not  bind  itself  in  any  way  at  that 
moment.  ^'Up  to  the  present  moment,  we  did  not  feel,  and  public 
opinion  did  not  feel,  that  any  treaties  or  obligations  of  this  country 
were  involved."  But,  he  added  significantly,  further  events  might 
change  the  situation  and  convince  Government  and  Parliament  that 
intervention  was  justified.  Belgium's  neutrality  might  be,  in  de- 
termining England's  attitude,  "I  would  not  say  a  decisive,  but  an 
important  factor." 

On  the  Eve  of  War. 

How  little  Paul  Cambon  was  satisfied  with  this  answer  is  shown 
by  his  own  report  on  the  interview,  ("Yellow  Book,'^  No.  110.)  He 
asked  Grey  whether  England  would  wait  before  intervening  until 
Germany  attacked  France. 

I  insisted  on  the  fact  that  the  measures  already  taken  on  our 
frontier  by  Germany  revealed  intentions  of  approaching  aggression, 
and  that  if  Europe's  mistake  in  1870  were  to  be  avoided,  it  behooved 
England  to  consider  from  this  moment  under  what  conditions  she  would 
give  us  the  help  on  which  France  counted. 

But  Grey  stuck  to  the  Cabinet  decision.  On  the  other  hand, 
Sir  Arthur  Nicolson,  whom  Cambon  met  when  he  left  the  office 
of  the  Secretary  of  State,  gave  this  much  consolation:  that  the 
Council  of  Ministers  would  meet  again  next  day,  "and  confidentially 
he  gave  me  to  understand  that  the  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign 
Affairs  would  not  fail  to  reopen  the  discussion." 

It  is  hardly  necessary  here  to  read  between  the  lines. 

Before  the  meeting  of  the  Council  of  Ministers  announced  for 
the  next  day  by  Nicolson,  answers  arrived  from  Paris  and  Berlin 
to  Grey's  question  as  to  Belgian  neutrality.  Naturally,  the  French 
Government  emphatically  promised  to  respect  Belgian  neutrality. 
In  Berlin,  on  the  other  hand,  the  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign 
Affairs  stated  to  the  English  Ambassador  that  he  must  first  consult 
the  Emperor  and  Chancellor. 


38       Germany* s  Case  in  the  Supreme  Court  of  Civilization 

I  gathered  from  what  he  said  that  he  thought  any  reply  they  might 
give  could  not  but  disclose  a  certain  amount  of  their  plan  of  campaign 
in  the  event  of  war  ensuing,  and  he  was  therefore  very  doubtful 
whether  they  return  any  answer  at  all.     (''Blue  Book/'  No.  122.) 

This  dispatch  of  Goschen  left  Berlin  late  on  the  evening  of 
July  31,  and,  according  to  a  note  in  the  English  "Blue  Book/'  was 
received  at  the  Foreign  Office  on  Aug.  1. 

The  English  echo  followed  promptly.  The  very  next  number  in 
the  "Blue  Book"  (123)  contains  a  telegram  from  Grey  to  Goschen 
dated  Aug.  1,  according  to  which  Sir  Edward  told  Prince  Lich- 
nowsky  that  the  answer  of  the  German  Government  regarding 
Belgian  neutrality  was  for  him  a  matter  of  very  great  regret,  since 
the  neutrality  of  Belgium  affected  the  feeling  in  England.  If 
Germany  could  answer  as  France  had  done,  this  would  contribute 
materially  to  lessening  the  anxiety  and  tension  in  England.  On  the 
other  hand,  if  one  belligerent  should  violate  the  neutrality  of 
Belgium,  while  the  other  respected  it,  it  would  be  extremely  diffi- 
cult to  control  public  opinion  in  England.  Prince  Lichnowsky 
inquired  in  his  turn  whether,  in  case  Germany  bound  herself  to 
respect  Belgian' neutrality,  England  would  bind  herself  to  remain 
neutral.  Grey  evaded  this,  maintained  that  the  hands  of  the  Eng- 
lish Government  were  still  free,  and  that  it  was  about  to  consider 
-what  it  was  going  to  do.  He  said  that  all  he  could  say  was  that 
its  attitude  would  be  determined  largely  by  public  opinion,  which 
deemed  Belgian  neutrality  of  great  importance,  but  that  he  believed 
that  England  could  not  promise  to  preserve  neutrality  solely  on  this 
condition.  Then,  Prince  Lichnowsky  urgently  inquired  whether 
Grey  would  not  state  the  conditions  under  which  England  would 
remain  neutral.  "He  even  suggested  that  the  integrity  of  France 
and  her  colonies  might  be  guaranteed."  But  to  this  Grey  replied: 
''I  felt  obliged  to  refuse  definitely  any  promise  to  remain  neutral  on 
similar  terms,  and  I  coTjld  only  say  that  we  must  keep  our  hands 
free."  Thus  reads  Sir  Edward  Grey's  own  report  on  this  interview 
held  on  the  morning  of  Aug.  1. 

Germany  went  even  further  in  the  concession  by  which  she 
wished  to  make  English  neutrality  possible.  On  Aug.  4,  1914,  the 
Imperial  Chancellor  announced  in  the  Eeichstag  that  he  had  offered 
to  the  English  Government  "that,  so  long  as  England  remained 
neutral,  our  fleet  will  not  attack  the  northern  coast  of  France" ;  he 
added  "that,  so  long  as  England  remained  neutral,  we  also  were 


Germany* s  Case  in  the  Supreme  Court  of  Civilization       39 

ready,  provided  reciprocal  measures  were  taken,  not  to  engage  in 
any  hostile  operations  against  the  French  merchant  marine." 

The  English  "Blue  Book'^  makes  no  mention  of  these  conces- 
sions. The  question  arises  as  to  whether  this  concession  was  ever 
brought  to  the  knowledge  of  the  English  Cabinet  by  Sir  Edward 
Grey.  That  the  omission  cannot  be  laid  at  the  door  of  the  German 
Ambassador  in  London  is  shown  l)y  the  French  "Yellow  Book" 
(No.  144,)  wherein  Paul  Cambon  reports  under  date  of  Aug.  3 
that  the  German  Ambassador  had  made  a  commanication  to  the 
press  stating  that,  if  England  remained  neutral,  Germany  would 
forego  all  naval  demonstrations  and  not  use  the  Belgian  coast  as  a 
point  of  support. 

Thus  Germany  offered,  in  exchange  for  the  neutrality  of  Eng- 
lan(i,  to  respect  tlic  integrity  of  Belgium,  and  of  France  and  her 
colonies,  and  also  to  forego  all  naval  operations  against  the  French 
coast  and  the  French  merchant  marine,  but  English  neutrality  was 
not  to  be  obtained  at  that  or  any  other  price,  as  Sir  Edward  clearly 
stated.  "England  wishes  to  keep  her  hands  free,"  was  the  transla- 
tion from  the  language  of  cant  into  that  of  sincerity  of :  "England 
is  already  bound  to  France." 

On  the  day  of  the  formal  and  categorical  refusal  to  remain 
neutral  under  any  conditions  (Aug.  1,)  Sir  Ed'ward  Grey  made  the 
following  announcement  to  Paul  Cambon: 

That  he  would  inform  the  Cabinet  of  the  unsatisfactory  answer 
of  Germany  regarding  Belgian  neutrality  and  request  to  be  em- 
powered to  say  on  Monday  (Aug.  3)  in  the  House  of  Commons 
that  the  British  Government  would  not  tolerate  a  violation  of  Bel- 
gian neutrality.  That,  moreover,  the  British  squadrons  were 
mobilized,  and  he  wished  to  suggest  to  his  colleagues  a  declaration 
to  the  effect  that  the  British  fleet  would  prevent  the  German  fleet 
from  passing  through  the  Channel,  or — should  they  pass  through — 
from  making  any  sort  of  demonstration  on  the  French  coast. 

It  cannot  be  assumed  that  it  is  customary  in  England  for  the 
Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs  to  impart  beforehand  to  the 
representative  of  an  interested  foreign  power  matters  of  world- 
historical  scope  which  he  contemplates  bringing  up  in  the  Cabinet 
council,  and  in  this  way  to  commit  his  country  to  a  policy  before 
the  Cabinet  has  spoken.  Such  procedure  is  all  the  more  remarkable 
when  it  has  to  do  with  decisions  against  which  successful  resistance 
had  already  been  made  by  members  of  the  Cabinet.     If,  notwith- 


40       Gerinany* s  Case  in  the  Supreme  Court  of  Civilization 

standing,  Sir  Edward  Grey  imparted  this  information  on  the  morn- 
ing of  Aug.  1,  thus  forestalling  the  Cabinet,  he  at  least  could 
excuse  himself  by  saying  that  he  thereby  bound  himself  no  more 
deeply  to  France  than  he  had  already  done. 

At  any  rate,  it  is  significant  that  the  English  "Blue  Book''  has 
no  report  from  Sir  Edward  Grey  to  the  British  Ambassador  at 
Paris  on  this  interview  with  Paul  Cambon,  whereas  Paul  Cambon 
did  not  fail  to  report  on  it  at  once  to  his  Government. 

England  and  Belgium. 

Paris  had  become  so  alarmed  on  account  of  the  opposition  in  the 
English  Cabinet  that  the  English  Ambassador  there  telegraphed  to 
London  on  the  evening  of  July  31  that  the  French  Minister  of 
Foreign  Affairs  was 

urgently  anxious  as  to  what  the  attitude  of  England  will  be  in  the 
circumstances  and  begs  an  answer  may  be  made  by  his  Majesty's 
Government  at  the  earliest  moment  possible.     (''Blue  Book/'  No.  124.) 

The  answer  was  the  unusual  announcement  of  Sir  Edward  Grey 
to  Paul  Cambon  on  the  morning  of  Aug.  1. 

Now  France  was- quieted  and,  without  awaiting  German  mobili- 
zation, the  French  Government  ordered,  on  Aug.  1  at  3 :40  P.M., 
the  general  mobilization  of  the  French  Army.  ("Blue  Book,"  No. 
136.) 

On  the  next  day,  Sunday,  Aug.  2,  Sir  Edward  Grey  made  an 
announcement  to  the  French  Ambassador,  which  he  repeated  on 
Aug.  3,  in  the  following  more  precise  form: 

In  case  the  German  fleet  passes  through  the  Channel  dr  traverses 
the  North  Sea  for  the  purpose  of  rounding  the  British  Isles  in  order 
to  attack  the  French  coasts  or  the  French  Navy,  and  to  alarm  the 
French  merchant  marine,  the  English  .fleet  would  intervene  and  lend 
the  French  Navy  its  full  protection,  so  that  from  that  moment  England 
and  Germany  would  be  at  war.     ("Yellow  Book,''  No.   143.) 

When  he  first  made  this  statement  Sir  Edward  Grey  felt  bound 
to  add  this  explanation:  The  English  Government  was  obliged  to 
take  into  consideration  far-reaching  questions  and  difficult  issues 
and  felt  that  it  could  not  bind  itself  necessarily  to  declare  war  on 
Germany,  in  case  war  should  break  out  between  France  and 
Germany,  but  that  it  was  important  for  the  French  Government, 


Germany^ s  Case  in  the  Supreme  Court  of  Civilization      41 

• 

whose  fleet  had  been  concentrated  for  a  long  time  in  the  Mediter- 
ranean, to  know  what  steps  it  was  to  take  for  the  protection  of  its 
entirely  unprotected  northern  coast.  For  this  reason  the  English 
Government  had  considered  itself  bound  to  make  the  announce- 
ment mentioned.  This  did  not  bind  England  to  enter  into  the 
war  against  Germany,  unless  the  German  fleet  acted  in  the  manner 
described  in  the  declaration. 

This  comment  shows  to  what  a  degree  the  agreements  between 
France  and  England,  though  not  formally  binding,  really  consti- 
tuted actual  obligations.  Merely  on  the  basis  of  the  plans  of  opera- 
tions agreed  upon  between  the  French  and  English  military  and 
naval  authorities  which,  in  case  of  war,  were  not  to  impair  the 
freedom  of  action  of  the  two  Governments,  the  French  fleet  had 
been  concentrated  in  the  Mediterranean.  And  now  the  British 
Cabinet  felt  itself  obliged  by  this  concentration  to  take  over  the 
protection  of  the  French  northern  coast  and  merchant  marine,  and, 
on  account  of  this,  to  enter  possibly  into  a  state  of  war  with 
Germany. 

Therefore,  if  during  the  time  between  Aug.  2  and  4  German 
warships  had  passed  through  the  Strait  of  Calais  or  the  North  Sea, 
a  state  of  war  would  immediately  have  arisen  between  Germany 
and  England,  since  such  an  operation  would  have  been  immediately 
taken  by  the  English  to  mean  that  the  French  coast  or  fleet  was  to 
be  attacked  or,  at  least,  the  French  merchant  marine  to  be  alarmed ; 
and  this  would  have  occurred  solely  because  of  the  obligations  which 
the  English  Cabinet  felt  to  be  imposed  upon  it  by  the  entente  with 
France,  which,  on  its  face,  bound  England  to  nothing;  all  this, 
moreover,  quite  irrespective  of  Germany's  attitude  toward  Belgian 
neutrality. 

But  Belgian  neutrality  remained  as  a  possible  reason  for  war, 
which  the  majority  of  the  English  Cabinet  felt  must  be  entered 
upon,  but  for  which  an  excuse  must  now  be  constructed  and  held 
in  reserve.  To  be  sure.  Grey  spoke  to  Cambon  on  Aug.  3  only 
about  the  sailing  of  the  German  fleet  as  a  casus  belli,  whereas  he 
did  not  even  mention  Belgian  neutrality.  On  the  other  hand,  he 
had  expressed  himself  in  the  interview  of  Aug.  2  to  the  effect  that 
the  Cabinet  was  still  considering  what  it  was  to  say  next  day  in 
Parliament,  and  whether  it  was  to  declare  the  violation  of  Belgian 
neutrality  a  casus  belli,  ("Blue  Book."  Xo.  148.)  Thus  Grey  had 
not  yet  put  through  in  the  Cabinet  his  proposal,  announced  to  the 


42       Germany^s  Case  in  the  Supreme  Court  of  Civilization 

> 

French  Ambassador  on  Aug.  31^  that  England  was  not  to  tolerate 
the  violation  of  Belgian  neutrality. 

One  must  now  deplore  that  in  those  days  the  German  fleet  did 
not  come  out  and  cause  hostile  action  on  the  part  of  the  English 
fleet.  Then  the  fairy  tale  that  England  was  forced  to  enter  the  war 
solely  by  the  violation  of  Belgian  neutrality  at  the  hands  of  Germany 
could  never  have  come  up. 

As  matters  developed,  the  second  pretext  for  war,  held  ready  by 
the  leaders  of  English  policy,  became  acute.  The  German  Govern- 
ment found  itself  obliged,  on  account  of  the  state  of  affairs  which  is 
already  but  too  well  known,  to  ask  from  Belgium  permission  for 
German  troops  to  march  through  its  territory.  The  King  of  the 
Belgians  asked  the  King  of  England  for  diplomatic  support  for  the 
protection  of  Belgian  integrity.  Thereupon  the  English  Govern- 
ment demanded  from  the  German  Government  an  immediate  decla- 
ration as  to  the  respecting  of  Belgian  neutrality.  ("Blue  Book,'* 
Xo.  156.)  The  German  Ambassador  made  a  final  attempt  by  im- 
parting to  the  English  Government  the  text  of  a  telegram  from  the 
Foreign  Department  asking  him  to  reiterate  most  emphatically  that, 
even  in  the  event  of  armed  conflict,  Germany  would  under  no  cir- 
cumstances annex  Belgian  territory.     This  telegram  continued: 

Please  impress  upon  Sir  Edward  Grey  that  German  Army  could  not 
be  exposed  to  French  attack  across  Belgium,  which  was  planned  ac- 
cording to  absolutely  unimpeachable  information,  ("Blue  Book,"  No. 
157.) 

This  final  attempt  likewise  failed.  The  English  Government, 
as  late  as  the  evening  of  Aug.  4,  presented  an  ultimatum  to  expire 
at  midnight,  at  a  time  when  German  troops  had  already  crossed 
the  Belgian  frontier.    The  war  with  England  had  begun ! 

That  England  would  have  entered  the  war  even  if  Germany 
had  not  in  any  w^ay  violated  the  neutrality  of  Belgium  needs  no 
further  proof  after  the  development  shown  above  of  the  French- 
English-German  negotiations  during  the  critical  week.  The  re- 
sponsible directors  of  the  British  policy  had  so  strongly  committed 
England  to  an  immediate  armed  intervention  on  the  side  of  France 
during  the  days  tliat  elapsed  after  the  handing  of  the  Austro-Hun- 
garian  note  to  Serbia,  arid  done  so  entirely  on  the  basis  of  the 
entente  with  France  which  did  not  bind  them  formally  to  anything, 
that  war  could  have  been  prevented  only  at  the  price  of  the  fall  of 


Germany^ s  Case  in  the  Supreme  Court  of  Civilization       43 

the  British  Cabinet,  and  of  the  reproach  to  England  of  having  acted 
perfidiously. 

That  those  who  had  brought  England  to  this  pass  profited  by 
working  to  the  utmost  the  pretext  of  the  violation  of  Belgian  neu- 
trality— which,  as  they  admitted,  they  expected  to  influence  public 
opinion  strongly — in  order  to  hide  their  responsibility  is  another 
matter.  How  insincere  this  pretext  was  has  often  enough  been 
pointed  out.  In  this  connection  attention  may  be  called  to  the  doc- 
uments, captured  in  Brussels  by  German  officials,  which  showed  the 
existence  .of  an  agreement  between  English  and  Belgian  military 
authorities  similar  in  every  way  to  the  French-English  agreement 
regarding  joint  action  by  the  two  general  military  and  naval  staffs. 
If,  with  regard  to  the  English-Belgian  military  understanding, 
England  maintains  that  the  measures  taken  dealt  exclusively  with 
the  possibility  of  a  violation  of  Belgian  neutrality  by  Germany,  and 
that  they  were  not  in  themselves  binding  in  any  way  on  the  policy 
of  the  two  Governments,  this  pretext  is  worth  exactly  as  much  as 
the  similar  one  continually  brought  forward  during  a  decade  by 
English  statesmen  in  Parliament  and  before  public  opinion  regard- 
ing the  character  of  the  French-English  entente.  But  in  the  case 
of  Belgium  the  relationship  is  made  particularly  clear.  Among  the 
captured  documents  there  is  a  record  in  the  handwriting  of  Count 
von  der  Straaten,  Director  in  the  Belgian  Foreign  Office,  of  a  con- 
ference between  the  English  military  attache  in  Brussels,  Lieut. 
Col.  Bridges,  and  the  Belgian  Chief  of  the  General  Staff,  General 
Jimgbluth,  on  April  3,  1912.  In  this  conference,  according  to  the 
record  of  Count  von  der  Straaten,  Lieut.  Col.  Bridges  stated : 

The  English  Government  during  the  recent  events  (Morocco  crisis) 
would  immediately  have  undertaken  a  landing  in  our  country  (Belgium), 
even  if  we  had  not  asked  for  help. 

The  General  objected,  the  record  continues,  that  for  this  our 
consent  was  necessary. 

The  Military  Attache  answered  that  he  was  aware  of  this;  but, 
as  we  were  not  in  a  position  to  prevent  the  Germans  from  marching 
through  our  country,  England  would  have  landed  her  troops  in 
Belgium  anyhow. 

There  is  nothing  in  Count  von  der  Straaten's  record  to  show 
that  Belgium  made  any  objection  or  reservation  regarding  this. 

Thus  England,  in  1912.  had  decided  to  throw  overboard  Belgian 


44       Germany'' s  Case  in  the  Supreme  Court  of  Civilization 

neutrality  on  account  of  which  she  ostensibly  has  gone  to  war,  with- 
out the  quiver  of  an  eyelash.  Belgium  herself  had  most  seriously 
compromised  her  neutrality  by  her  military  agreements  with  Eng- 
land. If  England,  despite  this,  wishes  to  make  the  world  believe 
that  she  drew  her  sword  to  protect  Belgium's  neutrality,  then  she 
is  playing  the  role  of  a  seducer  seeking  to  protect  the  innocence 
w^hich  he  himself  has  seduced. 

The  document  published  by  the  Governments  of  the  Triple 
Entente,  then,  provide  the  following  outlines  for  a  history  of  the 
beginnings  of  the  European  war : 

1.  Russia  caused  the  war  by  the  general  mobilization  ordered 
by  her  on  July  31,  which,  as  the  Russian  statesmen  knew  perfectly 
well,  made  war  inevitable  for  Germany. 

2.  All  the  pretexts  adduced  by  the  Russian  Government  for 
the  mobilization  are  weak.  Neither  Austro-Hungarian  nor  German 
military  measures  can  be  advanced  as  reasons  for  the  general  Rus- 
sian mobilization.  Instead,  the  Russian  Government  gave  the  order 
for  general  mobilization  immediately  after  Austria-Hungary, 
through  the  efforts  of  the  German  Emperor  at  Vienna,  had  decided 
upon  a  decisively  amenable  attitude  on  the  Serbian  conflict,  and 
had  made  known  this  resolve  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  Vienna. 
Thus  Russia  brought  on  war  by  her  general  mobilization  at  a 
moment  when  the  hope  of  preserving  peace  had  been  resuscitated 
by  a  conciliatory  step  on  the  part  of  Austria-Hungary. 

3.  Russia,  by  her  own  statement,  was  resolved  from  the  begin- 
ning of  the  crisis  to  face  all  risks  of  a  war  provided  she  were  sure 
of  help  from  France.  The  promise  of  unconditional  armed  support 
from  France  was  received  by  Russia  on  the  evening  of  July  29, 
coupled  in  all  probability  with  the  announcement  that  France  would 
have  England  on  her  side. 

4.  France  gave  her  promise  of  unconditional  armed  support  of 
Russia  only  when  the  French  Government  considered  itself  assured 
of  the  cooperation  of  England.  The  French  Government  received 
the  assurance  of  armed  support  from  England  through  the  an- 
nouncement which  the  English  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign 
Affairs  made  on  the  morning  of  July  29  to  the  French  Ambassa- 
dor regarding  the  defiant  statement  which  he  intended  to  make  to 
the  German  Ambassador. 

5.  Those  responsible  for  England's  policy  were  closely  bound 
from  the  start  by  the  entente  with  France,  and  made  up  their  minds 


GervmmSs  Case  in  the  Supreme  Court  of  Civilization       45 

during  the  critical  week,  if  not  before,  to  take  part  in  the  war  if 
France  should  become  involved. 

6.  Those  responsible  for  England's  policy  were  moreover  very 
ricrhtly  of  the  opinion  that  a  war  on  account  of  the  Serbian  ques- 
tion would  not  meet  with  public  approval.  For  this  reason  they 
bent  their  efforts  to  find  a  pretext  for  war  which  would  meet  with 
En-lish  public  approval.  This  was  provided  by  the  violation  of 
Bel-ian  neutrality,  which  had  been  jeopardized  years  before  by 
Beloium,  and  which  was  not  to  be  respected  should  emergency  arise 
by  the  English  General  Staff,  according  to  the  statements  of  the 
English  Military  Attache  in  Brussels. 

8  That  the  violation  of  the  neutrality  of  Belgium  by  Germany 
was  merely  a  pretext  for  the  English  Cabinet,  is  shown  by  the  fact 
that  before  the  sending  of  the  English  ultimatum  to  Germany 
regarding  Belgium,  the  English  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign 
Affairs  had  formallv  declared  to  the  French  Ambassador  that  Eng- 
land would  consider  passage  through  the  Channel  or  the  North  Sea 
bv  the  German  fleet  as  a  casus  belli. 

Triple  Entente  Held  Responsible. 
On  account  of  these  indispiitahle  interrelated  facts,  confirmed  hy 
the  official  utterances  of  the  Governments  of  the  Triple  Entente, 
the  contention  that  Germany  desired  and  caused  the  war  will  be 
adjud-ed  worthless  before  the  Court  of  History.  Kussia  is  adjudged 
the  iiu-endiarv,  France  and  England  the  fellow-criminals. 

It  does  not  lie  within  the  score  of  this  recital  to  delve  mto  the 
depth'^  of  the  fateful  concatenation  of  isolated  happenings  and 
negotiations  between  July  24  and  Aug.  4  which  caused  the  greatest 
and  bloodiest  of  wars.  Let  it  suffice  to  point  out  that  these  isolated 
happenings  and  negotiations— the  words  of  a  Grey,  a  Cambon,  a 
Sazonof,  the  negotiations  of  the  First  Lord  of  the  British 
Admiraltv  and  the  Kussian  Commander  in  Chief,  which  m  them- 
selves appear  insignificant  before  the  great  tragedy  of  humanity- 
are  merely  manifestations  rising  to  the  surface  at  the  decisive 
moment  of  the  forces  whose  rule  makes  up  the  world  history  of  our 

time.    These  are :  -r.    x    i     i.i 

In  Russia,  the  ambition  to  dominate  in  the  Near  East,  doubly 
strong  since  the  defeat  suffered  in  the  war  against  Japan,  and  de- 
termined, when  there  is  prospect  of  success,  to  break  down  by  force 
any  resistance  from  the  Central  European  Powers. 


46       Germany^ s  Case  in  the  Supreme  Court  of  Civilization 

In  France,  the  fateful  direction  of  the  entire  national  policy 
toward  the  negative  goal  of  irreconcilable  thirst  for  revenge,  which, 
allied  with  fear,  culminates  in  the  continual  readiness  to  attack  us 
in  conjunction  with  every  strong  foe  of  Germany. 

In  England,  commercial  envy"  against  every  rising  regime, 
coupled  with  instinctive  hostility  toward  the  strongest  Continental 
power  and  the  tradition  that  every  Continental  ambition  for  sea 
power  must  be  forcibly  crushed. 

These  heterogeneous  forces  spun  the  net  of  the  Entente,  which 
became  the  frightful  tool  of  the  small  minority  ardently  desiring 
war,  and  in  which  the  great  peaceful  majority  of  the  Eussian, 
French,  and  English  nations  became  hopelessly  entangled.  Russia's 
attitude  toward  Austria-Hungary  in  the  Serbian  question  placed 
the  burden  of  decision  on  the  Entente.  There  can  be  no  doubt  that 
one  word  of  refusal  from  France  would  have  sufficed  to  hold  back 
the  Russian  war  party.  It  is  at  least  very  probable  that  a  word  of 
refusal  from  England  would  have  held  France  back.  It  is  abso- 
lutely certain  that  every  word  of  encouragement  from  England 
must  necessarily  give  the  upper  hand  to  the  war  parties  in  France 
and  Russia.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  equally  true  that,  had  France 
and  England  stood  aloof,  no  matter  how  such  a  step  may  have 
been  formally  authorized  by  treaties  and  agreements,  the  triple 
understanding  would  have  been  destroyed,  and  a  new  direction 
given  to  the  policy  of  all  Europe,  which  necessarily  would  have  led, 
not  to  the  hegemony  of  a  single  nation,  but  far  more  to  a  state  of 
affairs  in  which  every  power  could  have  had  its  due. 

Confronted  with  the  choice  of  preserving  the  entente  or  preserv- 
ing the  peace  of  the  world,  the  statesmen  at  the  helm  in  Great 
Britain  and  France,  who  had  by  their  own  acts  and  words  in  reality 
lost  their  freedom  and  become  entangled,  sacrificed  the  peace  of 
the  world  to  the  Entente,  under  pressure  from  the  cliques  desiring 
war,  and  swept  in  their  wake  by  far  the  greater  part  of  the  public 
in  their  countries  by  appealing  to  the  sanctity  of  written  and  un- 
written treaties. 

To  make  clear  the  details-  of  this  complex  web  of  guilt  and  fate 
will  some  day  be  the  great  task  of  the  historians  of  our  time. 


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